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West Europe Report

No. 1607

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BELGIUM'S ROLE IN EUROSTRATEGY DETAILED

Brussels LE SOIR in French 4 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Christian Guy Smal: "Eurostrategy: Missiles and Men. . . "]

[Text] It was last December that the Atlantic Alliance made the "historical" decision to modernize NATO's Eurostrategic arsenal. In simple terms, it is a question of placing and deploying on the soil of five allied countries the Pershing II ballistic missiles and "cruise" missiles, as of 1983, in order to compensate for the threat facing Western Europe of over 100 Soviet SS-20, carrying three nuclear warheads each, already deployed and whose number is already increasing, since every five days one more missile is being added to this more than considerable nuclear battery.

Eurostrategy means NATO's possibility to hit the Soviet Union from Europe, by aiming at it medium range nuclear missiles.

The 108 Pershing II missiles to be deployed in West Germany (under American "key") would thus become, on our scale, the nuclear strategic striking force. Currently this can be achieved only by the American "central system," or, on a more modest basis, by British nuclear submarines (integrated within NATO) and French nuclear submarines (non-integrated with NATO).

One of the "logical" consequences of the Eurostrategy is that a nuclear war would be henceforth possible in Europe, at least in theory, without engaging the Soviet and American "central systems." This would be a confrontation which, considering the megaton possibilities of the superpowers, would mean virtually the end of the world. One could easily imagine all the political consequences which the Kremlin was to draw from the new prospects. Actually, the Soviets were not the only ones to attack the Eurostrategy.

This concept which, for quite some time, had been reserved to abstract thinkers, was suddenly retrieved by the politicians who quickly converted it into a local demagogy tool. The cruise missile became a conversational topic. Some among those who, on the very eve of the event, were considering it a "gimmick" included it in the catalog of their

electoral cliches side by side with trivia on inflation, unemployment misery and complaints concerning structural reforms and even disarmament.

Belgium has particularly distinguished itself in this matter.

For the past six months it has been questioning itself as to possibilities for negotiating with the Soviet Union and the future of detente. It signed the final communique last December in Brussels, and the June 1980 communique in Ankara with which the Atlantic Alliance clearly states that the Eurostrategic missiles are nothing but an answer to the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 (a deployment which, as we read in the statement published in Turkey, is taking place at a "rapid pace"). However, unilaterally Belgium expressed a concern for "evaluating the situation," as though Italy and Great Britain, which accepted the missiles on their soil, were not, for this reason, about to follow the development of events.

All these subleties would make no change in the fact that, despite its six-month "moratorium," by now past, Belgium has pledged with its signature a very clear principle, namely that of the need to answer through an Atlantic effort the effort already made by the USSR in Europe. The proclamation of the principle was paralleled, starting with December 1979, with a proposal for extensive negotiations with Moscow.

The Belgian "moratorium," as, in fact, the Dutch position (a two-year waiting period) could only strengthen the Soviet intransigence by dropping the very subject of negotiations. Let us emphasize that the Atlantic decision of last December clearly included a very broad range of proposals. This step was made even more credible by the fact that both NATO and Moscow have the time for an extensive discussion, since the Eurostrategic weapons would not arrive on our continent before 1983. Anticipating an "honor fight" on the part of the Soviets against the Pershings and the cruise missiles, the foreign affairs ministers of the alliance unequivocally proclaimed last December, in Brussels, that they would support a broad effort in favor of negotiations which, conducted at various levels, are aimed at restraining the growth of military arsenals: The Vienna negotiations on a balanced and mutual reduction of forces in Europe, a disarmament conference suggested by France, and a conference on European security to be held in Madrid next November. There is no shortage of negotiation opportunities. As of December, however, the Russians have been demanding the precondition that NATO renounce Eurostrategic weapons. Would that not make any discussion useless? The first question which arose, therefore, on the occasion of Schmidt's trip to Moscow was to know whether or not the Kremlin would consent to modify its position.

Let us recall that Belgium is scheduled to receive 48 American cruise missiles of the 572 nuclear theater missiles which will be deployed in five NATO countries.

The plan concerning Belgium calls for 12 launch pads and 48 nuclear missiles with a "single key." This means that their launching rests exclusively in the hands of the President of the United States. Our country would share neither in the production nor the costs.

The host country will simply provide maintenance and security. In Belgium 56 people would be sufficient to guard our three missile squadrons at the Petit-Brogel base. The Eurostrategic bill would amount to 500 million 1979 francs. The amount would be payable in portions and not before 1983, naturally.

We must also emphasize that the cost of the Euromissiles will be split among all NATO allies in such a way that the five host countries will not be alone in paying for the storage of armaments whose purpose is to defend everyone. However, we have gone far beyond such technical and financial matters. Today, after Afghanistan, and following the Giscard-Brezhnev Warsaw meeting, the Venice Summit, the Ankara meeting, and the Schmidt-Brezhnev Moscow meeting, those politically in charge must sort out their convictions.

Clearly, nothing could be harder. . . .

5157
CSO: 3100

DEFENSE MINISTER POSWICK INTERVIEWED ON STATE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Brussels SPECIAL-L'EVENTAIL in French 20 Jun 80 pp 5-7

[Interview with Charles Poswick, newly named Defense Minister. Poswick holds an LLD, plus degrees in political and diplomatic sciences and business and finance. A deputy in Parliament since May 1965, he joined the Vanden Boeynants-De Clerck cabinet on 19 March 1966 as defense minister, a post he resigned in June 1968. Former vice president of the PRL (Party of Reform and Liberty), he also headed the national defense committee in the Chamber.]

[Text] Charles Poswick sounds the alarm. Government's attitude toward national defense literally cause for consternation.

As all the NATO powers increase their defense budget by 3 to 4 percent, Belgium moves to cut its appropriations, thus completely breaking ranks with its Atlantic Alliance partners. Andyet, who should be aware of the failure of the detente process, if not our national leaders? Are not Cambodia, Ethiopia, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Iran all prima facie evidence of this? Is this really the time to turn up our noses at defense spending, when we are in the midst of an attack? Did Belgium really have to pick this year, 1980, when for the first time in years several western heads of state have brandished the threat of war, to stay out of NATO's fall maneuvers, and to shilly-shally over the question of installing the cruise missiles and the Pershings we need on our soil to offset the head start by the Soviets' SS 20 missiles? That our army is truly sick nobody can longer deny. And if our government, as it sets about cutting the budget, refuses to contemplate special measures for the defense portion of that budget, it will have to come up with some convincing arguments before its international allies, to whom it has made solemn commitments.

Charles Poswick, the new defense minister, has tried once more to sound the alarm -- if there is yet time. Nothing has changed since his predecessor, Jose Desmarets, alerted the public to the crisis besetting his ministry. If more people have been jarred into attention of recent days, it is probably because Mr Poswick has chosen a more sensational way of getting attention by threatening to resign, refusing "to preside over the bankruptcy of the army," if some solution was not found for its financial problems. It should be pointed out that Mr Poswick, who served as defense minister 14 years ago, is particularly well versed in matters military. As reserve commander of the airborne commando regiment, he kept abreast of department affairs while, as a PRL deputy, he headed the Chambers national defense commission.

We asked him to brief us on Belgium's position within the Atlantic Alliance, and to tell us where things stand now on those budget issues.

[Question] By its budget-cutting policy, Belgium has broken ranks with the Atlantic Alliance. Against this background, what does the future look like from where you stand?

[Answer] Belgium sincerely want to live up to the commitments it made several years ago, so there can be no question of breaking rank with the Atlantic Alliance. However, given the current budgetary restrictions, we are looking at an involuntary failure to honor those commitments. And the nation's defense is first to suffer from this policy of restrictions. On several counts, we are failing to live up to our obligations vis-a-vis NATO. This holds true in any case now for the short term, because our commitments are examined anew each year. We have in fact frankly informed our allies of this state of affairs.

[Question] That would mean, would it not, that if Belgium is no nonger operational at the NATO level, its role would be limited to that of a host country?

[Answer] No: the problem cannot be looked at in the short term. If we want to respect what is most important among our NATO commitments, we must have additional appropriations. If we do not get them, we shall no longer be living up to those commitments. However, I still hope we shall get them.

If for the longer term, which is to say for 1981, we find that the budget is once again gravely deficient, we have the option of going to our allies and notifying them that our NATO commitments will have to be reviewed. And if they agree, we shall cut back our efforts to the level our means allow in a context of real effectiveness.

[Question] Under a restructuring of the army which you perceive as a reduction in size, is it still possible to reconcile that cutback with Belgium's commitments to NATO?

[Answer] Commitments may be revised by common consent. So in the present situation, if it turns out that the means we have available are insufficient (which I am afraid is what we must expect given the gravity of the budgetary situation), we shall take the necessary steps toward talking about different commitments. It is up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a study in depth and to formulate proposals.

[Question] Can Belgium still defend itself, if we consider the fact that France, for instance, thanks to the RPR (Gaullist) vote, plans to increase its defense budget by 3 to 4 percent?

[Answer] All the NATO powers undertook last December to increase their defense budgets by 3 percent. My opposite number in Britain, whom I met a few days ago in Norway, gave me confirmation that his department's budget was going up by 3 percent as agreed. But as for us, not only are we not making that increase: we are cutting our appropriation by a little over 2.2 percent on account of rising fuel prices. The allies cannot but be very unhappy indeed at this state of affairs.

We are, though, living in a democratic country and I do not believe that the other countries, aside from formal representations and from drawing our very special attention to the responsibility we take, could bring any pressure to bear on our attitude. It is a matter of salving consciences which might perhaps provide the necessary incentive to make the effort the army considers vital. I don't see that we have any recourse other than appealing ton conscience.

[Question] Just as the British are going ahead with preparations for major maneuvers next September, the Belgians announce that they are pulling out of Operation Crossfire. After that, how can Belgium hope to retain its credibility within NATO? And what sort of image will our partners have of Belgium as international tensions build?

[Answer] Belgium's credibility is dropping fast, and nearing zero. And our allies are going to tell us so. I suppose that, when this happens, the government will take the necessary measures. I have written to the prime minister myself, asking him to bear this in mind.

[Question] Now that several generals have withdrawn their support from the idea of making ours a career army of professionals, you still favor the idea, but would like to see some changes made, is that correct?

[Answer] That is a long-term undertaking. I believe that we must give the military professional the image of a real professional soldier. The army must be in a permanent state of training and readiness. This means that we must ask those who agree to join, and who are volunteers, to manifest a spirit of self-sacrifice and of acceptance in connection with difficult missions, and to agree to length-of-service commitments very different indeed from those required in other government departments. It is with this in view that I believe we could single out among the career volunteers those who are sedentary by nature from those who will belong to combat units and who might be given special pay advantages or priority in subsequent reclassification in administrative positions, or again a range of opportunities for a better retirement pension... One could come up with a number of practical advantages which could be restricted to a relatively small force.

Nowadays, the career volunteer enjoys so many kinds of protection that everything grinds to a halt when he has pur in his 8-hour day, and that the survival of the nation ultimately depends on the opening and closing of barracks.

[Question] Even as the PRL is calling for stringent budget economy, particularly in social programs, it claims it can find the millions the defense department claims are needed for aviation fuel?

[Answer] The defense department, like all the rest, is effecting a 2.2-percent cut across the board in its operational budget.

This is why it has cancelled a number of planned exercises and why major reductions have been made in troop training and conditioning. The consequence of all these cutbacks will appear next year, when we will have to decide whether or not we can meet our NATO commitments.

And right now we have a particularly acute problem: to train and condition ground force troops, and to an even greater degree, air force troops, the fuel we planned to buy at a specific cost has risen considerably in price. In talking about this, one must not forget that 60 percent of the air force operating costs are fule costs. This means that, if we are to cut back to the absolute minimum, we need only relatively modest appropriations in the short term, for the forces to be capable of fulfilling their obligations. This is precisely what we are not getting, and what makes the situation grounds for grave concern in both the short and the long term. My predecessors have said the same thing time and time again.

I haven't gone out and discovered America; 6 months ago the cabinet was the target of urgent requests, back when Mr Desmarets was in office. Now I have taken over the job, and my ultimate weapon has been to say as publicly and loudly as I know how -- because I really had to make the public aware of it -- that there was a real problem.

[Question] Western armed forces have long felt it necessary to have a domestic force prepared to defend the country. Here, the airborne commandos and the reserves are the only ones who, in case of conflict, could take things in hand at that level. What would happen if training and practice for airborne units were to be cut back as a result of budget slashes?

[Answer] Should the airborne's mission become protection of the civilian population, its ground training and readiness is amply sufficient for it to do whatever is expected of it. Parachute deployment is only a way of getting there to them, and if jump practice must be cut back for lack of fuel, it would have no effect whatsoever on the civilian protection and assistance mission which might be assigned them.

[Question] Some Belgian generals, including the head of the Joint Chiefs, recently traveled to China. Do you feel that trips of this sort are justified, given the current state of the budget?

[Answer] It might be a good thing to argue that, in an 80-billion-franc budget, sending a man of such high rank to establish contacts and gather information, particularly when he has such unique technical competence, is certainly worth the trip. I am not trying to defend routine travel, but some contacts and some information are very helpful. You must admit that an army of 100,000 men must upon occasion perform diplomatic missions in the person of its chief of general staff, and this is not something that is going to prove the last straw on the back of the budget. That trip was not devoid of value, because it enabled us to learn a lot of very useful things.

[Question] Moving on to the paragovernmental organizations set up by the army (such as the OCASC [expansion unknown] and the Army Museum), which cost a lot of money, mightn't there be an additional budgetary problem to consider there?

[Answer] No question but that we must take a second look at a number of things, or that, now that we have been a peacetime operation for 40 years, there are some things that have outlived their usefulness.

Unquestionably, economies can be made, and I agree with critics in some quarters that the army has not made a sufficiently thorough examination of conscience on this score. However,

there is an effort under way now, and it is most certainly going to spread, thanks to the cutoff we have just learned of. My own hope would be to see this problem examined by a joint military commission, consisting of both civilians and military people (there have been six or so such commissions set up since Belgium became independent), which could look into the matter of the paragovernmental establishment as well as into the question of a professional army. The last mixed military commission met in 1966 to reconsider restructuring the armed forces.

[Question] On the matter of army-industry liaison, particularly in connection with contracts paid for out of international sources, a Belgian corporation can now invoke EEC regulations to sub-contract with foreign corporations. That might look just a bit illogical, in view of the fact that such compensation must, by law, benefit the Belgian economy forst of all. Wouldn't it be possible, insofar as army contracts are concerned, to force the Belgian corporation to sub-contract only with small and medium Belgian companies?

[Answer] All such contracts must, in practice, go through the ministerial committee for economic and social coordination. If a competition factor arises, and in view of variations in price and performance bids, I think that given equal price and performance (or even a slightly higher Belgian bid), we must give priority to the domestic sub-contractor.

6182
CSO: 3100

DEFENSE COMMISSION STUDIES HOME GUARD ELITE FORCE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 22 Jun 80 p 2

[Article: "Elite Corps of Home Guard People"]

[Text] The Home Guard and the Defense Command are studying the possibility of establishing a form of elite corps under the Home Guard.

This is apparent in a booklet with the theme: "The Home Guard is Tantamount to Danish Defense Will," in the DEFENSE LONG RANGE PLANNING SERIES. The booklet was written by P. A. Heegaard-Poulsen, editor of the HOME GUARD JOURNAL.

According to the writer, the special forces would if established, consist of young Home Guard members. They are to be set up either on the company level or on the district level. Each unit is to consist of 8 or 10 men.

According to the plans the small special units are to be put to use anywhere in the local area "and must be presumed to be better armed than the average in the Home Guard."

It is thought that the units will be used in particular against armored vehicles, and they are themselves to be equipped with vehicles, which is not the rule in the Home Guard.

11,256
CSO: 3106

HAAGERUP WEIGHS 'DENMARKIZATION' CONCEPT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Jul 80 p 9

[Article by Niels Jorgen Haagerup: "Is Europe Becoming Denmarkized?]

[Text] Brussels. The Finns have for many years been annoyed by the term "Finlandization." The term is used to describe a marked policy of adjustment in relations with the Soviet Union, a policy, meaning increasing Soviet influence. European Finlandization means increased Soviet influence upon the foreign and domestic policies of the European countries.

Now we in Denmark can begin to be concerned about a new term that has cropped up in the international press, the term "Denmarkization." It is not flattering to us. In fact, it is less flattering to us than Finlandization is to the Finns. The term is found in an article in the SUNDAY TIMES of this week, written by several jornalists of the British newspaper about Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his negotiations in Moscow this week.

The article states that criticism of Schmidt in Germany has been concentrated upon three different artificial concepts, namely Finlandization, a term which according to the article gives Moscow increasing influence upon German foreign policy against [sic] advantages in trade and security. The second concept is Denmarkization, meaning according to the British paper, that a country counts upon American protection without being willing to share the risk or pay the bills. The third concept referred to in the article is that of Rapollo, referring to the German-Soviet pact of 1922.

One can choose to regard the term Denmarkization as quite inappropriate and reject it, as the Finns have the wide-spread use of the term Finlandization. But one can also, as has President Kekkonen, make the best of it and use the term Denmarkization in a positive sense. This is difficult, however. Is it unjust? Denmark's defense budget amounts to over 7 billion kroner. We are not getting a free ride. But what the situation is in fact or what we ourselves think is not what matters. What matters is what others think of us, the opinion formed elsewhere. If the term Denmarkization gains acceptance we shall be stamped as a country that attempts to

escape as cheaply as possible from its obligation to participate in the defense of the West. That the term implies that we do not wish to share a joint risk probably has to do with our rejection of nuclear weapons and stationing of allied forces on our territory in times of peace. When it is said that we do not wish to pay the bill it may be due to our resistance to increasing the defense budget.

This is a gross simplification. But it will do us no good merely to be offended. Perhaps we can still do something to prevent the term Denmarkization from becoming generally accepted. Or is it already too late?

11,256
CSO: 3106

BRIEFS

GREENLAND AIRPORT EXPANDS--Modernization of the Narssarssuaq airport in southern Greenland is now assured. Finance Minister Svend Jakobsen has reached an agreement with the European Investment Bank on a loan of 36 million kroner. The modernization will cost a total of 72 million kroner. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Jun 80 p 7] 11256

CSO: 3106

BONN-WASHINGTON POLICY DIFFERENCES NOT CAUSE FOR ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENT

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 27 Jun 80 p 1

[Article by Marion Countess Doenhoff: "Are the Germans Anti-American? Tensions, Moods, and Misunderstandings"]

[Text] Germans and Americans--friends for 30 years. And now? Uneasiness, mistrust, and tensions mark the climate. Suspicions and misunderstandings cross the ocean in both directions. However, general reconciliation broke out in Venice. It was said that everything had been merely a misunderstanding. But the question of how long this assertion will remain valid is inescapable. So, what is the matter? What has caused this development?

There are two reasons: emotional and substantive. A psycho-analyst probably would be far more qualified than a journalist to examine the former complex. The reason is that much is simple hysteria. Across the ocean, fertile soil is provided by emotionalization resulting from the hostage affair and the painful recognition of powerlessness. Over here it is the election campaign which is misleading the opposition, perplexed by Chancellor Schmidt's popularity, and driven to inventing new horror stories daily.

The favorite is the assertion, disseminated in many variations, that the SPD, manipulated by leftist radicals, is succumbing more and more to Moscow's influence and that this alone is causing the SPD to become more and more anti-American. Across the ocean, the pertinent quotations are feeding the suspicion of Euroneutralism, or they may even awaken the mistrust that Bonn might be neglecting the alliance.

Friedrich Zimmermann, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU faction, said that Carter's letter to Helmut Schmidt confirmed the "deep crisis" into which Schmidt's "intentions regarding negotiations in Moscow" have plunged the Western alliance.

Franz Josef Strauss talked about an "Ostpolitik, ideologically determined and introduced in secret negotiations with Italian communists." He added that the SPD government was heading toward a "socialist society and submission to Soviet power policies."

Helmut Kohl declared: "It would be a catastrophe if the SPD's silly anti-Americanism were to spread further."

Well, how are things in reality? Is there an anti-American mood in the Federal Republic? Only a very superficial view may produce such an impression. Those who look a little more closely will find that criticism, worry, and certain anti-feelings have nothing to do with antipathy, that they have nothing at all to do with the American nation, but rather with its present leadership, that is, with personalities. If the Ford/Kissinger team were still at the helm, there would probably would be no cause for accusing the Germans of anti-Americanism.

Even those who are not poll fetishists might wish to consider the following figures as proof: According to DIE WELT, the Emnid Institute found in March that "90 percent of the Germans would like better relations with the United States." The institute said this was the highest quota of sympathy it had ever found. When the Allensbacher Institute asked in January to who was Germany's best friend, 53 percent answered: "the United States." France came in second with only 14 percent of the votes.

Lack of Confidence

No, there is no anti-Americanism here. The lack of confidence in America's leadership, present everywhere in Europe, is being mistaken for Anti-Americanism. An earlier Allensbacher survey asked the question, "How strong is your confidence in the leadership role of the United States?" Only 8 percent answered, "Very strong." In view of Jimmy Carter's inconsistency, which we can observe again and again, this lack of confidence really is not too surprising.

On Friday of last week, President Carter declared in Rome that Washington would hold to the sanctions it had applied against Moscow. News agencies reported the following day that Washington had eased the grain embargo against the Soviet Union, and Secretary of State Muskie declared that the embargo probably would be lifted entirely. For weeks the White House had been saying: We will not talk to the Russians so long as Afghanistan is occupied. But then 1 day Muskie and Gromyko were sitting together after all. There are innumerable examples of lack of direction and unpredictability, and no one is more merciless in enumerating them than the Americans themselves. Anthony Lewis wrote in the NEW YORK TIMES: "Wherever you listen among those who know something about foreign policy, you sense a feeling of deep disquiet--despair would not be too strong a word."

Of course, one does have to ask oneself for the cause of this unsteady posture. The Americans, exceedingly optimistic, for a centruy undefeated, much admired, and walking the heights of power--and look at what they have had to go through during the past 2 decades! First there was the sobering experience of the Vietnam war which they had thought to be a defense of freedom just like in Berlin. The feeling of moral superiority and the dollar were the victims. Then came Watergate and the depressing discovery that even the infallibility of the president is an illusion. And now, finally, there is the hostage

affair and the events in Tehran, which have made the limits of their power unequivocally clear to the Americans. Events like these really must make an idealistic nation deeply insecure.

The irritations of an emotional nature described so far probably will be forgotten after the elections. But this will not prevent the periodic reappearance both among our neighbors and overseas, of the anxious question: Where are the Germans headed? This is a hypothesis of history with which we have to live. But what about the substantive problems?

In part, these concern the relations between Europeans--all Europeans--and the Americans. Perspectives differ, and they probably must. There are many reasons, geopolitical as well as historical. Experience gathered through the centuries has taught the Europeans that not much can be accomplished with the concept of punishment in foreign policy. They consider it dangerous to isolate the Soviet Union. This is why they advocate further contacts. These nations have seen their best die in two world wars, the British and French empires perished, the German Reich was mutilated and devastated until it was unrecognizable. No wonder, then, that the Europeans value peace above everything and that they are shocked at irresponsible provocations. The Americans, of course, also suffered great losses, but their soil was not a battlefield.

Same Goals, Different Emphasis

We in the Federal Republic have the same goals as President Carter. But at times the emphasis is on different aspects. For us, living in a partitioned country whose other half is under communist rule, Moscow has a different meaning than it does for America. By the same token, detente has a different meaning for the two.

Every government of the Federal Republic has to strive for a constructive Ostpolitik. Bonn, as a regional power, cannot allow itself to lose sight of regional interests. It has to think about easing things for the people of the GDR, it has to think about the security of Berlin, it has to think about the East European neighbors. Every government in Washington first of all has to think about the global interests of the superpower, balance of power, stability, and limitation of nuclear armament.

It was primarily the problem of the medium-range missiles which in recent weeks gave cause for tensions. But in this connection it makes no sense at all to surmise that Schmidt, while in Moscow, would frustrate the NATO armament decision, a decision whose existence is primarily a result of his own initiative. If there were differences, it was because Washington first of all thinks about the deployment of the medium-range missiles. On the other hand, Schmidt, like the other Europeans, considers the second part of the agreement as most important above all--disarmament. At the moment when we believe that the Soviets are now militarily superior and that we have to fear getting the short end of the stick in a new armaments race with the Americans, there is great danger that the Soviets might be tempted to make the most of their present advantage. For that reason alone they must not be isolated at this point.

The Europeans have become more independent in recent years. It was unavoidable in view of the often bemoaned weakness in American leadership. But--and this has to be kept in focus--nothing has changed in the agreement between European and American interests. The goals are the same, but Washington has to get used to a division of labor. A monolithic bloc is not the thing for a democratic West. Britain's foreign secretary recently expressed this in a brief and proud sentence: "It is our judgment, not our obedience, that we offer to our friends and allies."

9687
CSO: 3103

LATEST POLL SHOWS SPD, OPPOSITION IN VIRTUAL TIE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 19 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Fritz Ullrich Fack: "CDU/CSU and SPD Almost Neck and Neck--Poll Results and Climate of Public Opinion in First Half of 1980"]

[Text] Frankfurt, 18 July--After the latest opinion polls, before the summer vacation time, there are a great many indications that the two big parties will come in neck and neck at the Bundestag election on 5 October. The replies to the so-called Sunday question posed by the Allensbach Institute for Demoscopy ("If the Bundestag election were held as early as next Sunday, which party would you vote for?") over the past 3 months have settled between 44 and 45 percent as far as the two parties are concerned. While the CDU/CSU have lost about 2 percent since January, the SPD has gained about 3 percent during that period. The Free Democrats for a long time have registered a pretty even 6.5 to 7.5 percent nationwide, and have also done so in the first half of this year. (See table)

The Strength of the Parties

"If the Bundestag election were held as early as next Sunday, which party would you vote for?"

1980	CDU/CSU	SPD	FDP	Greens
		(percent)		
January	46.6	41.4	7.5	4.1
February I	46.1	42.8	6.9	3.7
February II	45.2	43.6	7.2	3.3
March	44.9	43.4	7.3	3.9
May	44.1	44.7	7.6	3.2
June	44.7	44.4	6.3	3.0
July	44.6	44.5	7.3	2.7

Source: Institute for Demoscopy, Allensbach

For comparison, before the last Bundestag election in 1976, the CDU/CSU scored 49 to 50 percent in the polls at that time and the SPD 40 to 41 percent. This gap which existed for many years has lessened progressively since the fall of 1978 with the pollsters fixing the time of the beginning of the reverse converging trend as the date of the Hesse Landtag election of 8 October 1978.

The Allensbach figures do not make possible a forecast of the 5 October election results. They are still too much time time to go. In former elections it turned out time and again that the climate of public opinion was subject to change until the last moment. The general trend in this respect in the last months has been determined by increasing pressure on the CDU/CSU. The pollsters have developed a number of indicators for the direction and strength of this pressure. They include readiness to identify with the respective party of one's preference (for example, also in the use of stickers), the degree of readiness to reply to questions in general, and the average deviation of the so-called "quota of recall" on the part of the people polled as regards the actual result of the last election--in this case the 1976 Bundestag election. The greater the error of recall on the part of the people polled--always on the average--in favor, or to the detriment of the various parties, the stronger the pressure of the public opinion climate. Deviations in the quota of recall can reach values up to 20 percent with the party showing a deficit in the quot of recall being at a disadvantage as far as the pressure of the climate of public opinion is concerned. Until the time during which the past polls were conducted, the pressure has been directed against the CDU/CSU.

Lately this pressure appears to have let up somewhat. A not inconsiderable factor probably was the campaign against Strauss, regarded in many parts as unfair and going as far as slandering him. Now--probably because of this negative effect--this campaign has been clearly curbed by those who initiated it.

Judging by all previous experience, the result of the 5 October Bundestag election will be determined by the trend in the public opinion climate in the last 4 weeks. In case of pronounced pressure in one direction or another, it is possible that there will be noticeable deviations from the currently available poll results.

8790
CSO: 3103

FINANCIAL DISPUTE BETWEEN STATE, LAENDER CONTINUES

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 14 Jul 80 pp 32-33

[Text] The conflict about the distribution of burdens between the state and the Laender is merely adjourned; the Bonn Government considers the Laender proposal no more than a trick.

The provincial chief was optimistic in assessing the world situation: "Margaret Thatcher, Turkey and Afghanistan have been dealt with for 1981," exulted Bernhard Vogel (CDU), minister president in Mainz.

The Rhineland-Palatinate premier was inspired to paint such a glowing verbal image by the tax compromise negotiated between the state and the Laender. In fact the simmering international crises had long been the crucial topic during the financial haggling.

Finance Minister Hans Matthoefer had obstinately insisted that the Laender simply had to share in the rising cost of defense, aid to Turkey, development aid and, not least, Europe, and do so by way of a redistribution of the turnover tax. Finally Matthoefer agreed to a trade-off: The Laender will contribute DM1 billion toward the increase in the children's allowance.

The state, therefore, will still be allotted only 67.5 percent of the value-added tax revenues; the Laender keep their 32.5 percent. However, the agreement will last only until 1 January 1982: The tax conflict is merely adjourned.

Further clashes are inevitable because Matthoefer's opponents are already preparing for their next assault. Hardly had everybody expressed satisfaction with the flaccid compromise when Schleswig-Holstein's Minister President Gerhard Stoltenberg renewed the attack. Stoltenberg--slated to be Franz Josef Strauss minister for finance in the shadow cabinet--said that in the forthcoming election campaign the CDU/CSU would certainly not omit discussion of this topic.

In any case, that was bound to happen. The Federal Chancellor accused the Laender of wishing to financially starve the state and of attempting to prevent the Federal Government from carrying out its constitutional functions. The Laender, especially those ruled by the Union, are bound to counter this charge by equally strong criticism.

The opposition holds that the social-liberals should not have squandered the taxes paid by the citizens nor have incurred so many debts. If they had done so, they would not now have to raid the cash boxes of other and thriftier people to enable them to discharge their duties.

The election campaign clamor does not, however, serve merely as a vote catcher: Each party is attempting at the same time to ensure a good starting position for the inevitable next round in the fight for the financial equipment of state and Laender.

Ultimately even the Union Laender will have to acknowledge that the state is financially disadvantaged. In 1979 it was already compelled to borrow some 13 percent of the money needed for its expenditures; the Laender, on the other hand, financed only just under 7 percent by way of loans.

Still, the opposition has long discovered how to wield the whip. While Lower Saxony Minister President Ernst Albrecht admitted that the Laender may not--as per the constitution--deny the state the money to meet its "necessary expenditure," he claimed that first there would have to be a discussion as to "what constitutes necessary state expenditure and what necessary Laender expenditure."

His Kiel colleague followed this up: "The prime object of negotiations on financial relations," said Stoltenberg, "must be the curtailment of mixed financing."

This clearly outlines the CDU/CSU concept: It does not admit that the state is justified in calling for additional finance. If such should turn out to be required after all, a redistribution of turnover taxes is certainly not to be the immediate remedy.

Instead it should be considered whether the state might not withdraw from certain spheres which it currently finances jointly with the Laender. The minister presidents suggest, for example, in future to handle as Laender tasks exclusively such items as social housing or hospital construction. The state should then use the savings to meet its international obligations.

This expedient appears seductive. It sound most acceptable from the political aspect and--at first glance--really makes sense.

After all, Laender chiefs are unlikely to please their parliamentarians by informing them that their financial scope would have to be further narrowed by the cession to the state of another lump of value-added tax revenues. It

seems much more attractive for the Land--costs remaining the same--to take on full responsibility for the former common tasks.

Moreover, the Laender may now quite handily cope with hospital and housing construction since everywhere in the Federal Republic the most urgend needs of the postwar period have been satisfied. Meeting the demand in hitherto neglected regions or problem areas is certainly more a matter for the Laender than the central government.

The Laender argue that the Federal Finance Minister would be relieved thereby of a considerable part of the burden. Social housing construction, for example, will cost the state some DM1.4 billion in 1980, and DM875 million will be needed for new hospitals.

And yet, despite the apparent monetary advantages, the Federal Finance Minister is openly skeptical of the Laender proposal. Matthoefer fears that the different interests of wealthy and poor Laender, of rural and urban Laender, social-liberal governments and Union governments will merely increase the wrangling about money.

An analysis prepared by the Federal Ministry of Finance puts it succinctly: "The Land Schleswig-Holstein is most unlikely to welcome the withdrawal of state financing from coastal defenses; the disentaglement proposals of the Bavarian Free State will certainly not include the hill farmers program."

The Finance Minister is also disturbed by another disadvantageous aspect of the Laender proposal: This solution would not provide any relief for the state in the short and medium range.

After all, housing and hospital planning is a long-range business. The state will have to remain responsible for the subsidies earlier promised for specific buildings.

In that case, should the Laender take on only the costs of new commitments, their apparently courageous readiness for sacrifices will little avail the state in the first few years. Matthoefer's experts estimate that, in 1982 for example, only between DM6-60 million would accrue to the federal treasury.

A senior official in Matthoefer's ministry therefore quite plainly expressed the Bonn Government's assessment of the talk of mixed financing and turnover taxes: "The Federal Government is to be conned, nothing more."

11698
CSO: 3103

GISCARD'S RECENT PRESS STATEMENTS SUMMARIZED

Paris LE POINT in French 30 Jun 80 p 31

[Text] Seven topics: the key sentences. In the course of his press conference VGE uttered several key sentences. LE POINT has picked them up and bracketed them with seven topics.

Independence

"France's foreign policy is neither neutral nor neutralist... French foreign policy is not neutral, because we belong to an alliance. If the terms of that alliance were at stake, France would faithfully fulfill its obligations. Nor is [French foreign policy] neutralist. France is a democracy of freedom. It seeks everywhere in the world to help the democracies of freedom to success and development. Of course, it does so by peaceable means."

Afghanistan

"The solution, which must perforce be a political one, must exhibit three features: first, it must include the total withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Afghanistan; second, it must allow the Afghan people to choose their destiny for themselves ...; lastly, it must lead eventually to the restoration of Afghanistan to its traditional historical position, which is that of a nonaligned country, incapable either of constituting a threat in itself to neighboring nations, or of serving as a base or support for the creation of such threats."

And in reply to President Carter's proposal for an interim settlement:

"We must not in my view seek a temporary solution at this time. I believe that we must, on the contrary, seek a definitive solution, since I see no chance of an interim solution."

The Middle East

"The solution to the Middle East problem consists in reconciling two fundamental rights... The first is the State of Israel's right to security... The second right is the right of the Palestinian people to exist. The approach to the problem is to evacuate the Arab territories occupied in 1967, territories which are truly Arab... Once they are evacuated, the problem of the Palestinian People's Organization can be dealt with in a positive way."

Greater Europe

"I have never talked about a break... I will show you a very simple way to move forward on expansion: let all the member states of the Community of the Nine announce today that they will accept, beginning in 1982, the rules of financial policy as written and the rules of agricultural policy as written."

Defense

"Any nuclear attack on French soil would automatically trigger a strategic nuclear response... France is directly concerned in the security of neighboring European states... The proposal to reduce the length of [compulsory] national [military] service, given the insecure state of the world, would be interpreted as desertion or resignation on France's part. The government, which I have consulted on this issue, will accept neither that desertion nor such a resignation."

Reform

"While reform is no easy thing to do, once it is done, it will perhaps enter more profoundly into citizen behavior and convictions in France than in any other country."

The Gaullist Tradition

"As for the memory and the deeds of General de Gaulle, I shall answer you by quoting Paul Valerie: "The true tradition in great matters is not to redo what others have done, but to rediscover the spirit that did those great things and which will make them quite different things in another time."

6182
CSO: 3100

CAUSES OF CORSICAN PROBLEMS, REASONS FOR AUTONOMY MOVEMENT

Paris LE MONDE in French 24, 25 Apr 80

[Article by Nicolas Alfonsi, Corsican radical left former deputy and attorney to the Court of Paris: "Corsica in the Eighties"]

[24 Apr 80, p 13]

[Text] 1. Community in Danger of Extinction

The dramatic events in Bastelica and Ajaccio at the beginning of January gave rise to a series of reactions in Corsica and on the continent which we reported (LE MONDE 29 January and 11 April). We continue to do so by publishing a two-part article on the island's problems by Nicolas Alfonsi, former deputy and mayor MRG [expansion unknown] Piana in southern Corsica.

An initial observation must be made: The causes of conditions on the island can no longer be sought in soothing reminders of the loss of the Empire, election fraud, the "piedsnoirs," or other cliches regularly served up by the media rather than attempting a more general explanation.

Actually, the one and only problem--and we ourselves raised it here after Aleria--remains the realization, dating from 1965-1970, of the disappearance of the Corsican community or people and at the same time--as the past decade has shown--the realization that it was impossible to remedy the situation, given the current state of the country's political and social structures.

The reasons for the breakdown of the Corsican community are complex. Destined for galloping population growth at the beginning of the century, Corsica, with its 310,000 inhabitants and removed from all foreign influence, might have experienced a boom similar to that of its neighbors on the Mediterranean. World War I (1914), which took the lives of 28,000 young Corsicans--a quarter of the current population--and assimilation into a broader economic unit offering Corsican young people astonishingly reduced social prospects cut short any such growth.

However, like its Mediterranean sisters, long removed from trade circuits, Corsica could have withstood the superficial constraints of the outside world without losing its identity. But the economic changes it was to suffer beginning in the 1960's stifled the last struggles of the old social structures. Leaving the political structures with the appearance of power, the economic laissez-faire would cause new structures to emerge and the island would be unable to withstand the final assault. Thus, as individual destinies brightened, the collective fate grew dim. Today, despite some exceptions, the rural world that begins 3 kilometers from the coast has been emptied of its substance and abandonment of the land is visible everywhere.

The Corsican language, whose disappearance in 20 or 30 years sums up the situation, is no longer spoken today even by children in rural areas because there are no more children. The age pyramid of the 100,000 to 120,000 native Corsicans who still live on an island with 220,000 inhabitants, including 40,000 immigrant laborers, is standing on its head.

These are the facts. Two lines of reasoning may be drawn at this point and two strategies are involved.

Two Logical Chains of Reasoning

On the whole, they confirm the individual destinies-collective fate duality to which we referred a moment ago. In the former instance, emphasis is on the Corsicans and the need to insure their integration into the national unit. In the latter case, priority is given to survival of the Corsican community or people. For purposes of simplification, let us say that the government chose the former; the nationalists the latter. Thus, for the president of the republic, there is no Corsican problem; rather, there are problems in Corsica. For the nationalists, there is above all a community to save.

The blocked situation now facing the island and which could last for 10 years is merely the result of these extreme choices. It should be the responsibility of the island's left to find the ways and means of such a difficult synthesis, if such a thing is possible. For the time being, let us limit ourselves to noting that we are far from it.

The government has chosen its strategy, probably with no deliberate Manicheism: development of the island. It has its reasons. In the long run, there will be no Corsican problem without any Corsicans to create one, and the decade now beginning may well be decisive.

Rapidly learning their lesson from Aleria, within a few months they will grant what some elected officials have been demanding for a long time: Adoption of the principle of the University of Corte's territorial continuity toward which haste has been made slowly, a clean-up of the election environment and bidepartmentalization, which, above and beyond

any ulterior motives, improves the administrative structure of the island, will all constitute stages in an apparent improvement of the situation.

However, none of this will prevent the spread of violence. The government's shrewdness will consist, not in waging a vigorous fight against violence but in allowing it free rein. An increasingly disenchanted view, one opposed to violence, unconsciously attributed its origins to the nationalists. Nor would those holding such a view forget when they went to the polls in March 1978. In June 1978, when Valery Giscard d'Estaing went to Corsica, he would face the consequences of the March election. It may be asserted that absolute national solidarity is necessary in order to help Corsica emerge from its underdevelopment, but also that the island is and must remain a place where common law prevails.

It is important to emphasize that the financial aid granted by the government is substantial.

Nevertheless, the channels for distribution, the methods of allocating credits and the beneficiaries, whether local collectives or socioprofessional organizations, are too diverse and too well concealed in this Neapolitan society which Corsica is at that level, to prevent an extraordinary waste of public moneys. And if, as Valery Giscard d'Estaing stressed in Ajaccio, "waste means indifference," then we can say that, despite any goodwill shown, the latter sentiment actually represents what is felt about the island. This is a complete contradiction of the current policy of making a considerable but poorly oriented effort--due to the lack of new political structures--to insure optimum use of the credits and make the effort effective.

At the institutional level, in fact, the history of the past 20 years reflects a double evolution in the opposite direction. As long as the autonomist problem did not exist, specific provisions provided in successive stages the right to be different, without anyone getting upset about it.

The fiscal regulations of 1962, the establishment of the Corsican Economic Fund (CEEF) and the 1968 fiscal regulations, the creation of a mission for Corsica, the specific provisions for the proposed 1969 referendum law regarding--in contrast with other regions--a regional council elected by direct, universal suffrage with a majority of the votes (elected directly by majority, direct universal suffrage voters), which provisions were successfully reinstated under the July 1972 law, were all elements in what was an increasingly original situation.

It would have sufficed for the autonomist notions to take root and grow in order for a trend in the opposite direction to be put into motion at

once by the government with the establishment of the two departments and the transformation of Corsica into a common law region forming the decisive stage.

A sort of rump parliamentary, which a recent minor reform increased in size to 70 members, the regional council has never succeeded in asserting the originality of the situation it could have enjoyed.

The government now chooses to adopt an icy attitude and hangs on to common law. So much time was wasted without promoting the necessary reforms that the merest whisper of change in institutional structures, however subdued, appears to some as the first step toward secession. But a much deeper reason undoubtedly results in maintenance of the status quo, postulating that settlement of the crisis comes not so much from institutional solutions as from economic development.

[25 Apr 80, p 35]

[Text] Uncertain Hopes

Given the collapse of the island community (LE MONDE, 24 April) two opposing strategies come to the fore: The government in power would insure integration of the island into the national unit, whereas the nationalists would like to insure the survival of the Corsican people.

Within the framework of a liberal society, the obtaining of basic equipment, the media, commuter air service, information processing, whose effects are already perceptible, Telex and video tape recorders in the very near future, will all do away with ethnic differences more effectively than any speeches could. Thus, it will be a long test of strength between those in power and those who, for lack of a better term, are commonly called "nationalists."

Among the latter, the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) has the most clearly defined strategy: independence, without which no salvation is possible. Only independence, granting the Corsicans their national rights, can put a stop to the bloodletting. Wiping out two centuries of life in common, ignoring cultural as well as economic and family ties that have developed in that time, the FLNC is thoroughly aware of the unequal ratio of forces. The violence it generates, the targets it chooses, are adapted to that ratio. Given the prospect of such a design, the adversary ceases to be the government and becomes the French state, whose sovereignty is rejected. As a result, for this underground group, distinguishing between the majority and the opposition, the right and the left, is a problem of semantics. To this day, such a claim seems so utopian for the vast majority of the Corsicans--who in their moments of intranquillity have already arrived at "self-determination"--that in all their political groupings and statements they avoid any mention of it.

The public denunciation of such a project by the autonomists, particularly Dr Simeoni's Union of Corsican People (UPC), does nothing to dissipate the confusion which the latter creates in the public's mind between the different components of nationalist claims, the latter ranging from militant regionalists to those who find themselves in the ranks of the FLNC.

Just as much as the latter, the autonomists are out to save the Corsican community. They claim that only an autonomous status within the framework of the republic will enable them to prevent the community's extinction. For the more pessimistic among them, it involves a petition of principle that will in the long run lead to the same result, namely separatism.

The diversity of sensitivities forming the current are at one and the same time its strength and its weakness. Everyone--particularly between two referenda--feels like something of an autonomist in all good conscience whenever it is a question of preserving a fragile identity or of decentralizing the decision-making power. Nevertheless, all that the current could attract, up until 1977, in the way of wealth, ideas and potential, was gradually dissipated while the speeches became ever more radical.

While the terms "repression" and "liberty" can still draw a crowd in Ajaccio when it is a question of demonstrating solidarity, still they are not sufficient to provide a common objective for those with autonomistic leanings. Moreover, it does not appear that many Corsicans recently demonstrated any backing, in the Mutalite, between a "Punk" group and a leftist faction, for the claims of the Kanaka people, however justified such a position might be. It is even less comprehensible how the autonomists can attain their objectives when their action is faced with a double rejection of violence and universal suffrage, vitiated by election fraud.

Control of election rolls can be improved if the political will to do so exists. However, subject to these remarks, no observer could in good faith deny the progress achieved. Indeed, the refusal to endorse universal suffrage entails above all the possibility of denouncing--in the name of a fine amalgam--all elected officials with the exception of those not part of the clan.

Since the recourse of abstention was used in 1974 and 1978, one can fearlessly wager that this will again be the choice in 1981 for the vast majority of the Movement. However, this did not prevent a very strong turnout in Corsica for the last few elections, with voters returning to their national ideological fold, as in Dordogne or Herault.

In this subtle nationalists-government dialectic, the role of the autonomist movement, for the time being, has led to sporadic results on the occasion of crises which regularly occur. At the same time, the movement objectively strengthens the local majority. Between elections, power is in the street.

Then the excesses begin to appear and voters do not forget this at the polls, which ultimately confirm the success of the majority. The latter, finding in the results the reasons for the island's satisfaction, believes there is nothing to change and the cycle begins anew. It may last for 10 years at a time, so long as the government can minimize attacks and pass them off as everyday occurrences.

Preliminaries

In this blocked situation, the island's left, now in shreds, is not a viable solution.

The victims of the repercussions of the crisis it is suffering on the national level, the partisan spirit of its local members and its antiquated radical structures, the leftist movement, seemingly driven more by a desire to tear itself apart rather than by a concern to wage realistic action, will risk being absent from the debate for a long time unless it quickly tries to pull itself together.

And yet, up until 1978, there was no lack of its comments--albeit scattered--on the Corsican situation: Regionalization of the PC, special status for the PS and an "a la carte" status by means of an outline law for the leftist radicals all constituted proposals--particularly the latter two--deserving of attention.

Nevertheless, since that time, the feeling of being excluded from power has led the PC and the PS--let us set aside the term "radicals," an expression which belongs to out-dated, declining political structures--to stick with the role of dissent, especially since the exercise of responsibility does not seem to be something for the immediate future.

Long opposed to autonomistic issues, the PC is now attempting, and not without some difficulty, to integrate them into its own plans. But to use propaganda such as "They are running our factories!" on an island which 15 years ago witnessed the closing down of its only industrial plant, or to throw the autonomist struggle into the same bag with the one waged against iron and steel industry owners in Lorraine or grape growers in the Midi, would not seem to be the best means of making people relate the claims.

Regrettably, the PC in Corsica, because it is only a party of members and finds itself excluded from local posts occupied by radicals, is no

more than a marginal element. Consequently, its speeches only grow more exaggerated, without thereby achieving results, and public opinion only confusedly assimilates its claims with those of the streets.

What is more, not infrequently the national directors of the leftist movement indulge in the same excesses. For example, their bill on the Corsican statute refers to the "oppression" of which the Corsicans are allegedly the victims, and a member of Parliament, heading his delegation stated, with a straight face, in Bastia that the standard of living in Corsica "might even be lower than that of certain Third World countries." Finally, if the PS advocates a specific law at the institutional level, it nevertheless lacks the boldness to go so far on its own, since Corsican structures in fact remain the common law structures of this group.

Such a state of affairs on the island at the beginning of the 1980's and the total lack of any medium-prospects cannot, a priori, inspire anything other than pessimism. It should be the mission of the Socialist left to attempt to open up the situation with a number of concrete proposals. However, it is first of all necessary to adapt its behavior to its remarks and to remove ambiguities and contradictions.

For instance, to condemn the FLNC's attacks without concretely specifying how they could be eliminated, on the pretext that since the left is in power they would disappear by themselves together with the causes which bred them, is nothing more than a plea of principle when one is aware of the nationalist claim.

Is it not just as difficult to assert, as if it were obvious, just as the executive bureau did, that the solution of the problem depends on "coming to grips with the identity of the Corsicans and initiating structural reforms which would enable the island to emerge from underdevelopment?" Now we have come to the heart of the matter. Is the synthesis of identity and development possible once Corsica has plunged into the modern age?

The search for a solution acceptable to the greatest number of Corsicans depends on immediate measures and a longer-term policy.

It involves certain preconditions: on the one hand, the affirmation that Corsica is part of the republic, but as long as its situation in this framework, considering its past and its geographical features, can be nothing but original; on the other hand, the abandonment of all current speeches about repression (even if it does exist), freedom, collectives, and so on. Then there is the need to discover a less partisan behavior pattern for the presidential majority, for which the attacks--alas: like war for Clausewitz--are but a continuation of the policy by other means, as if its interests were necessarily one with those of the island.

From that time on, everything would be negotiable and two timely measures could effect considerable improvement in the current environment. The first is a regional reform, the socialist proposal for which, while still requiring amendments, does sketch out the broad outline. Since the current departments are preserved, it presumes the election of a regional council by direct, universal suffrage, which at the same time is proportional. This regionally elected council would consist of 40 to 50 members who would have the task, within the framework of broad powers, to govern the future of an island with an area of 8,500 square kilometers. By reason of the very method of its appointment, its unwieldiness and the traditional reflexes of its members, the present assembly can do nothing new.

Thus, an intelligent and available group of young people, who ask nothing more than to serve, are not being given the means to do so. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the most clear-thinking of nationalists could reject such an instrument for long. One is not offering to a group... the means to do so. This being the case, the government rejects it. Such wringing of the hands over common law cannot fail to amaze one, particularly when one realizes that Corsica has already known this assembly elected by direct suffrage, but based on a majority. Only the technical question of proportional representation remains. How can one persist for so long in rejecting such an instrument for such paltry considerations?

We readily agree that the regional institution alone is not likely to save the Corsican community. But it will be what men make it and it could well constitute the beginning of a vast series of reforms in the fiscal and cultural domains that would restore its originality.

The second urgent measure concerns the people themselves and it has a name: amnesty. Certainly, coming a year before the presidential elections, it does give rise to problems of timeliness but it is clearly in the direction of the public interest, even if it would cost a great deal for many--and one can understand them--to suggest these measures. What can French society and a solid state truly fear from the freeing of 40 nationalists? Can we have become so weakened that their liberty could shake the state? Moreover, what positive advantage would the government derive from such a measure? And who in the future would ever dare evoke, except in jest, the mere words "repression" or "liberty?"

In addition to these two immediate measures, a longer-term qualitative policy should undertake, regarding employment, to combine its development in Corsica--rich in potential job opportunities--with the return to the island of many young Corsicans now working on the continent.

Naturally, to believe that every Corsican who participated in the Diaspora desires to return to the island for good is a pipedream. There are many thousands who, feeling that they are both Corsican and French, hold enviable posts in the social hierarchy and have absolutely no

intention of settling in Corsica. Homesickness is much more of a plague in low-level positions and among the lower classes and it is to those who employ these people that this policy should primarily be directed, for there is no proof that its cost would necessarily be greater than the effort which the government is now making.

What is important is that the government take the steps.

7129
CSO: 3100

VANBREMEERSCH APPOINTED ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF

Paris LE MONDE in French 4 Jul 80 p 22

[Article by Jacques Isnard: "General Claude Vanbremeersch Appointed Armed Forces Chief of Staff"]

[Text] Upon recommendation of Minister of Defense Yvon Bourges, the cabinet, on Wednesday 2 July, appointed General Claude Vanbremeersch as armed forces chief of staff, replacing General Guy Mery. The latter will become overage in grade on 20 October this year.

General Guy Mery has been armed forces chief of staff since August 1975. But he did not wish, for purely personal reasons, to have his appointment extended beyond the normal term, as is occasionally the case for officers assigned to these important responsibilities in the military high command.

General Guy Mery's departure did, however, pose problems of precedence due to the fact that it is difficult for the chiefs of staff of the three services to agree to continue to serve under a successor to General Mery who would be much younger than them and junior to them in grade. In the French armed forces of 1980, such considerations still retain a certain importance.

The army chief of staff, General Jean Lagarde, who is to remain in his present position until March 1981 and becomes the senior "full" general in the French armed forces, could probably have taken umbrage at the appointment of any other general than Vanbremeersch.

The air force, in particular, was prepared to submit a candidate, namely Lt Gen Michel Forget, currently the commander of the Tactical Air Forces, who like most air force generals is younger than his counterparts in the other two services.

The chief of state chose General Claude Vanbremeersch who had served as chief of the special military staff in the Office of the President of the Republic from June 1975 to June 1979. Valery Giscard d'Estaing had time, therefore, to assess this general officer's qualities and loyalty. Even though the armed forces chief of staff is officially subordinate to the

defense minister, he is in continual touch with the Elysee Palace and is responsible for shaping a military policy according to guidance received from the president who is commander in chief of the armed forces pursuant to the Constitution.

But, in addition to this intellectual closeness to the chief of state, this appointment has another advantage, namely that General Vanbremeersch belongs to the same Saint Cyr class--the class designated "Franco-British Alliance of 1939"--as General Mery and General Lagarde.

The next armed forces chief of staff even graduated at the head of his class at Saint Cyr. Thus generals Vanbremeersch, Mery, and Lagarde are friends of long-standing, and to such a point that the nickname "the three from Saint Cyr," based on the title of an old motion picture, was humorously given them in the army.

General Vanbremeersch will, in principle, become overage in grade in January 1982. Consequently he is an armed forces chief of staff who, unless the term of his appointment is extended, will not have time to radically change the military establishment from top to bottom, inasmuch as he will most likely be busy preparing the next 5-year military program for 1982-1987.

Biographical Data

Claude Vanbremeersch was born in Paris on 3 January 1921. Upon graduating from Saint Cyr, he served as a lieutenant in an infantry battalion before being given an "armistice leave." He then joined the resistance movement was arrested by the Gestapo in 1943, and deported to the Buchenwald concentration camp in December of that year. Upon being liberated in April 1945, he participated in the German Campaign as a member of the French mission to the U. S. 12th Army Group.

He later served in Indochina. In 1952, he was assigned to the General Secretariat for National Defense, a position to which he returned after having served for a few months with the French military mission to the Royal Khmer government in Cambodia.

After attending the Ecole Superieure de Guerre [Advanced War College], he commanded the 29th Alpine Chasseurs Battalion in Algeria in 1959. He then served at the Ecole Speciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr [Military Academy]. In 1963, he was assigned to the army general staff. He was promoted to colonel in 1965 and commanded the 35th Mechanized Infantry Regiment. In 1970, as brigadier general he commanded the 1st Mechanized Brigade. He later seved as deputy army chief of staff. Promoted to major general in 1973, he commanded the 3d Division stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. In June 1975, with the rank of lieutenant general he became chief of the special military staff in the Office of the President of the Republic. Promoted to general in July 1979, he then assumed command of the 1st Army in Strasbourg.

8041
CSO: 3100

NATIONAL IDENTITY CARD FILE APPROVED

Paris ZERO UN INFORMATIQUE HEBDO in French 9 Jun 80 p 40

[Text] Last March the Ministry of Industry referred to the National Committee for Information Technology and Liberties a request for an opinion prior to the implementation of a data processing operation called "making of national identity cards" of which the principal objective was "to avoid the fraudulent obtaining of titles and their falsification. The National Committee for Information Technology and Liberties (CNIL) has just approved this project, subject to certain changes.

The changes requested by the committee are the following:

--No statements other than those included in present cards and the one indicating sex will be made in the new identity card.

--the projected utilization of OCRB type as well as an optical reading zone will not be maintained, since "the project submitted to the committee does not specify the objective of such a zone."

--The identification number of the card holder will refer to the card and not to the person: it will contain only the code of the department of birth, followed by the chronological serial number assigned to each title at the time when the card is made.

Possible Destruction

Security measures are likewise envisaged. The committee hopes, in fact, that "access to the system will not be authorized except for the establishment of cards; that the system will be protected against any intercepting of information going through the network; that no research in the working or management card file will be technically possible for purposes other than that of the individual establishment of titles; and that in case of exceptional circumstances the destruction of the system can be proceeded with in conditions and according to a procedure which are to be provided for in the form of instructions.

The new system will be in place by the beginning of 1981, with the possession of a national identity card remaining, moreover, optional as in the present order of things.

The replacement of identity cards with new, plastic-covered cards is linked with the creation of an automated card file, actually making possible the easy detection of unlawful activity.

When the minister of the interior made known his intentions in this matter, he provoked an almost general outcry: an attack on individual liberties, a threat to joint liberties... This card file was immediately placed on the black list.

Michel Jobert, president of the Democrats' Movement, in a letter addressed to OL HEBDO, (No 582 of 3 March 1980) clearly stated: "To automate an identity card file on the level of France is a very unwise action which jeopardizes national interests. Neither statutory texts nor administrative measures will limit this danger," and he suggested "forbidding even a rough draft of this project."

He was not heeded. The card file will exist.

A Democratic Assumption

Are the measures prescribed by the CNIL sufficient to limit its scope?

Answer by Mr Thyraud, president of the committee: "The ministry of the interior has committed itself to respecting only the objectives envisaged at the time of the creation of the card file, and in no case can the new national identity card serve as a key for gaining access to other card files"; card files which probably are, according to the president, much more "explosive" than that of the identity cards.

And he added: "Everything is based on a democratic assumption; in another context, the data processing would certainly be dangerous."

It is just to be hoped that we will not find ourselves too soon in that "other context."

9498
CSO: 3100

ROCARD'S POSITION ON NEUTRON BOMB NOT THAT OF PS

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Jul 80 p 10

[Article: "Hernu and Chevenement Consider Rocard's Position on Neutron Bomb To Be Inconsistent With That of PS"]

[Text] Charles Hernu, socialist member of parliament from the Department of Rhone and the PS [Socialist Party's] defense expert, reacted Thursday 3 July to Michel Rocard's stance on the neutron weapon. Hernu declared: "By cunningly twisting my words, Michel Rocard inferred therefrom that I had said 'yes' to provisional production of that weapon and added that we concur with the chief of state on this subject. As for me, I reject this interpretation, because I say 'yes' to studies and 'no' to production and deployment."

Hernu also noted that "Rocard does not rule out the idea of a professional (career) army. He even thinks that this could be the party's position in the future." Hernu then added: "I do not wish to prejudge the Socialist Party's decisions on this issue and I adhere to its firm and repeated advocacy of compulsory national military service reduced to 6 months."

In a press release, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, a member of the PS national secretariat, stated that Rocard's expressed views on the neutron weapon and the professional army "are utterly inconsistent with the socialist plan and party decisions."

In a statement broadcast over France-Inter on 2 July, Rocard had said: "A country of France's stature and importance, situated on the strategic defense system's most vital continent, cannot fail to attempt to acquire the most modern weaponry. Consequently, I concur in initiating research and development of the neutron bomb. The Socialist Party has said this, hence I concur." Rocard had also said: "I am one of those who believe that we must restudy the question of the professional army.... Personally speaking, I will not rule out the idea of a solution through the professional army."

The position of the PS on the neutron bomb, as expressed by the party's executive board on Wednesday 25 June, is as follows: "While it may be advisable to modernize our weapons designed to fire the warning shot, and to acquire the means with which to study and technologically master neutron warheads, we do not agree with the decision to produce and deploy such weapons, action that, under the present circumstances, would result in making us participate in the forward nuclear battle, contrary to the Socialist Party's official choice of the strategy of deterrence."

3041
CSO: 3100

DELIVERY OF MISSILE-LAUNCHING GUNBOATS DELAYED

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Jun 80 p 21

[Text] Cherbourg - Contrary to his hopes of seven months ago, Commander Aziz Reza Kerachian, chief of the Iranian purchasing mission in Cherbourg, will not get back to the port of Bouchir in the Persian gulf going down the gangway of one of the three missile-launching gunboats being kept pawned by Mechanical Construction of Normandy.

The shipyard was unable to reach an acceptable compromise. Referring to the customary practice according to which a final settlement is made at the conclusion of a warranty period, Tehran still refuses to pay the 30 million francs (about 12 percent of the total amount of the contract) owed to the Cherbourg constructor. And, the disagreement not having been settled at the level of the governments, the shipyard has had no choice but to freeze the Iranian order, under the penalty of losing the warranties taken out with the French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade (COFACE).

The situation has become embarrassing, for certain Iranian sailors have the impression that they are being held as hostages: their departure in the near future therefore should come as no surprise. Ever since 20 of them were sent back to their country, the 80 remaining at Cherbourg have been saying that they are impatient for the same thing.

The affair grew worse a week ago when three messengers came from Tehran for a discussion with the Iranian mission without deeming it necessary to inform the French authorities of it in advance. There may be among the sailors who are camping aboard motor launches that are being kept under guard by the shipyard in Cherbourg some men who are in less of a hurry to return to their homeland. But what it a certainty from now on is that only 10 will be designated to remain in France.

The 70 others, including Commander Kerachian himself, are waiting for their airplane tickets. An operation which, it seems, involves other difficulties because of the disorganization of air traffic going toward Iran. For its part the director's office of Mechanical Constructors of Normandy is

preparing to bring the motor launches back up to its own workshops. In spite of the delay in the due date, which should have been honored one year after the delivery of the last three units, i.e., by mid-1980, the Iranian program does not really put the shipyard in a difficult position. Nevertheless the latter has had to start the activities of its "fishing" department up again by taking orders from trawlers for Breton and Norman ship-owners.

The shipyard's load plan is insured for the short term only. A search for a future buyer for the three Iranian missile-launching gunboats seems to be out for the time being because 1 year ago Imam Khomeyni had authorized, considering how far it had progressed, the concluding of this business deal entered into 6 years ago by the shah.

9498
CSO: 3100

IMPORTANCE OF RAW MATERIALS SUPPLIES STRESSED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 2 Jul 80 p 8

[Article by Laurence Allard: "Raw Materials: Manage Supplies"]

[Text] The dangers of energy dependence are often mentioned. But raw materials supply is just as important. What would we produce tomorrow without titanium, copper or lead?

The government has decided to devote 1.6 billion francs between now and December 1981 to building up a "reserve stockpile" of mineral raw materials. Andre Giraud, minister of industry, declared during the annual meeting of the Federation of Non-ferrous Ores, "we want to have available an average of 2 month's consumption."

The increase of domestic demand and the continuous rise in price of nonferrous metals--copper especially reached its highest price in 5 years in January--have increased the trade balance deficit in this field. In 1979 it rose to 7 billion francs, compared with 4.7 billion in 1978. The rate of coverage dropped from 60 to 55 percent. While France produces more nickel than it consumes, it depends on foreign countries for more than 50 percent of its lead and copper.

Combat Speculation

However, raw material prices have not recorded any sudden rises for a year. The prices of lead and tin remained firm while, according to the federation, those of aluminum, copper and nickel again became more normal. When a price rise takes place, it is of a speculative nature.

To combat speculation, the makeup of the raw materials stockpile, which the government is building up, will remain confidential. It will vary on the basis of the more or less strategic nature of the materials. Industrialists will have access to it when the shortage will be "genuine and unavoidable" or as it is expressed by prohibitive prices. At fi[illegible]ht these

conditions are very restrictive, but they can be adapted to the situation, through their interpretation. Andre Giraud said, "examination of records will be strict and discriminating. It is the responsibility of industrialists to draw up their supply plans and estimate the risks of an interruption."

The measures for release of exchange decided on 25 June should facilitate their task. From now on enterprises can choose more freely than in the past, the date and the amount of their purchases and thus pay for them at the least price. The anti-inflationist nature of the measure is obvious.

The prospects for business in the mining and metallurgical sector in the second quarter are not very promising. With 250 enterprises largely devoting themselves to production and initial processing, basic industries attained a turnover of 25 to 30 billion francs in 1979. Jean-Yves Eichenberger chairman of the Federation of Nonferrous Ore and Metal Trade Union Committees, declared: "In the past they did not have the means of financing French raw materials supply and assuring control of the necessary sources."

Increased Research

This tendency seems to have been reversing itself for some time. Thus the BRGM [Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration] is devoting a more and more important part of its activities abroad to productive areas and PUK [Pechiney-Ugine Kuhlmann Company], the French leader in aluminum, has just emphasized its international outlook by participating in a sizeable investment in Australia.

8490
CSO: 3100

BRIEFS

ANDRIEU PETITION DECISION--Following the resignation of the head of the economic services staff of L'HUMANITE, several reporters on the newspaper's staff wanted to pass around a petition as a pledge of their adherence to the party line as presented at the openings of the 22d and 23d party congresses. The editor in chief, Rene Andrieu, refused to let the text of the petition circulate because he considered it "untimely." [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 14 Jul 80 p 24]

POLICE REINFORCEMENTS--After [Prime Minister] Raymond Barre's trip to Madrid, the decision was made to reinforce the French police along the French-Spanish border and the members of the DST [Territorial Security Directorate] responsible for keeping an eye on the Basque autonomists. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 14 Jul 80 p 24]

CSO: 3100

PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES ECONOMY, NATO

Bonn DIE WELT in German 19 Jun 80 p 5

[Article by Claus Bienfait: "America and NATO Can Depend on Us"]

[Text] None of the four parties got a clear majority in Iceland's December parliamentary elections. The formation of the government was only made possible when Gunnar Thoroddsen together with three other delegates cut loose from his conservative Independent Party in order to lead a coalition from the liberal Progressive Party and the communist Peoples Party. DIE WELT spoke with the Icelandic prime minister in Reykjavik.

DIE WELT: Mr Prime Minister, after it had long not been possible to form a coalition, your left-oriented government has held office for more than 4 months. How stable is it without a broad parliamentary majority?

Thoroddsen: My government is not left-oriented. I would prefer to characterize it as a center-left government. And it is so stable that I may hope to survive the 4-year legislative period.

DIE WELT: Right now you are under heavy pressure from the important fish industry, which is demanding an immediate devaluation of Icelandic currency and is threatening a closing of the factories. Can you deal simultaneously with the danger of unemployment and heavy inflation?

Thoroddsen: The problems of the fish industry result principally from serious sales difficulties on the North American market, and they were unexpected, as for years we have been able to sell more and more fish. Now we have to find a way out of this crisis before it generates unemployment. Of course, fighting inflation is the government's principal goal. By 1982 we want to have the 60 percent loss in value of money of the previous year in hand so that it compares with the situation in comparable countries. The future looks good because Iceland has natural energy reserves.

DIE WELT: Iceland's foreign debt has grown to one-third of the GNP. Will your government return to a solid financial policy?

Thoroddsen: It is true that we have considerable foreign credit, but we are doing this primarily in order to build waterworks with this money and to be able to finance the expansion of the long-distance heating system from hot springs. These currency debts thus help us save on the future expenditure of currency to purchase oil, which is becoming more and more expensive.

DIE WELT: After protracted negotiations the Icelandic government was able to settle a conflict with Norway over the Jan Mayen Island. A few days ago Denamrk extended its fishing zone around Greenland to 200 nautical miles. What is going to happen when trawlers from Common Market countries begin to fish there?

Thoroddsen: I do believe that this will lead to a new fish war. Just as we came to terms peaceably with the Norwegians, we will deal with the Danes and the Common Market commission in Brussels.

DIE WELT: Iceland is the only NATO member with communist participation in the government. Must it be taken into account that your country will withdraw from the Western alliance into neutrality or in the long-range align itself with the East?

Thoroddsen: No, no. It is true that the socialist People's Party belongs to my coalition government, and it has never disguised the fact that it rejects our NATO membership. But the remainder of the government as well as a large majority of the parliament are for it. And before I accepted the office of prime minister it was established in negotiations that the new government would do nothing against NATO.

DIE WELT: And what about the defense treaty with the United States?

Thoroddsen: That remains in force. We want neither to terminate it nor to change it.

DIE WELT: How secure is peace in Northern Europe and the Arctic; how undisturbed is the military balance? Do you not have to fear that 1 day a military conflict will break out, possibly started by differences over natural resources?

Thoroddsen: I do not believe in this possibility.

9485
CSO: 3103

CALABRIA INDUSTRIALIZATION EXEMPLIFIES PCI STRATEGY PROBLEMS

Paris PEUPLES MEDITERRANEENS in English Jan-Mar 79 pp 105-121

[Article by Graham Chapman, University of Reading professor: "Notes On the Strategic Weakness of the Italian Communist Party, With Special Reference to the Calabrian Development Policy"]

[Text] Introduction

When Berlinguer, the Secretary of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), outlined the strategy of the « historic compromise » (Rinascita 28th September, 5th and 9th October 1973) the aims were three : to break the position of isolation and impotence into which the party had been forced since the 40's; to help channel the energies of the social revolts of the 60's into a concrete alternative which would not risk the repetition of what had happened in Chile; to try and to harness the increasing discontent of large numbers of proletarianised whitecollar workers. At the same time it was considered essential to safeguard both the interests of the working class rank and file and the « marxist » ideology of the party.

Needless to say the Italian « experiment » has attracted a great deal of attention within the left both communist and non communist. The major reason is that the PCI's attempt to associate itself with a fundamentally conservative party - the Christian Democrats (DC) - by-passed the traditional popular front strategy and opened the way for a different type of opposition between European Communist Parties and the right, in which the policy of direct confrontation in the workplace and in the « piazza », as well as within parliament, gave to one of indirect confrontation within the state machinery itself. This line was considered to offer two advantages. Firstly it provided immediate, if somewhat unsatisfactory, access to power and the prospect of concrete gains for the party and its supporters. Secondly by substituing a concrete national perspective for what were formerly ideological aspirations it automatically further weakened ideological dependence on the USSR - a dependence which at the present conjuncture in the evolution of European democracy was becoming a severe disadvantage to the party's electoral appeal. The PCI's strategy thus provided a positive alternative to the deadlock in which other CP's found themselves. And even if other Communist Parties were not in a strong enough position to negociate for direct participation in the running of the state as was the PCI, the PCI's development nevertheless offered them the prospect of a solid long term strategy.

As a result, for a short time at least, the French CP was encouraged to speed up its move towards « destalinisation » and to relax its « ouvrierist » sentiments. The PCI's policies have also helped provide support of the Spanish Communist Party's independent line against the Kremlin and a coherent strategy with which to confront the post Franco situation.

Predictably the revolutionary left has also taken an interested, if less enthusiastic view of what the PCI has been trying to do. It has lamented in no uncertain terms the increasing loss of opportunity for open confrontation between capital and labour and allied classes which has resulted from the « historic compromise ». Its objections are both theoretical and practical. Theoretically it considers that, if the working class had little to gain from the implicit acceptance of the « bourgeois » state which was to be found in the PCI's former strategy, it has even less to gain from the explicit adherence to the bourgeois state embodied in the PCI's new line. From the point of view of the actual practice of the historic compromise it holds that the PCI's peaceful confrontation with the DC within the state machinery is rapidly being transformed into corporate collaboration between two potentially hegemonic parties.

Both these points of view, the Communists' and revolutionary left's, seem to me to be lacking in practical consideration, and therefore risk misunderstanding the historic implications of the « compromesso storico ». Sympathisers of the PCI have tended to stress only the *external* problems which the new developments have created : the reaction of the DC; the possibility of an extreme right coup and the role of the Italian military forces and of the USA. In other words, at least until recently they have treated the party in a idealistic way implicitly considering it to be facing the « compromise » with an organisation basically devoid of internal contradiction. The party itself has naturally encouraged this view. Indeed its platform has largely been based on presenting itself as an effective and efficient adjunct to an inefficient DC. The result is that the internal and strategic problems the party is facing have been dangerously overlooked in order to maintain their image of efficiency.

The revolutionary left has been equally guilty of refusing to consider the strategic problems of the PCI - though for completely different reasons. Their excessive concern with questioning the ideological purity of the PCI's collaboration with the DC has in the end led to an aprioristic analysis so that when difficulties in the historic compromise have arisen they have tended to be dismissed by the revolutionaries as mere confirmations of their initial assumption that the PCI is embarked upon a basically revisionist line. Thus, even when the PCI has been discussed in depth, the argument has usually been concerned to prove the party's revisionism from a purely theoretical (and often overabstract) point of view (1). The result is that there has been a serious lack of discussion of other important questions such as what the historical possibilities are for an alternative line given both the present structure of the party and the limitations imposed by the current « rapport de force » in Italian liberal democracy : and not least what the concrete details and implications of this revisionism are both [illegible] party and for the Italian political system as a whole.

This theoretical and practical laziness on both sides has obfuscated the role of the PCI and of the historic compromise which can only be appreciated by an attempt to unite both the internal and external problems the party faces - and uniting them on a theoretical and concrete level. This is something, which for various reasons, cannot be done here. What I hope to try and

do, on the other hand, is to redress the balance by making a series of observations mainly about some of the practical problems faced by the party in its approach to the industrialisation process in a region of the Mezzogiorno - Calabria. I believe that certain lessons can be learnt from this experience regarding the structural problems and inadequacies of the PCI as a whole and I hope to emphasise the more general import of the Calabria policy by bringing in examples from outside the immediate field of research.

However, although this approach has the advantage of providing some empirical examples of PCI strategy it must be emphasised that because I am starting from the particular and moving to the general, any conclusions reached about the PCI as a whole must be considered partial and tentative. The point of view from which this critique is made is not easy to elaborate in a few words and should be implicit in the critique itself. However some clarification is necessary. I do not accept, for instance, the point of view of the revolutionary left that conflict between labour and capital should necessarily be overt: I believe this all the less because Italian liberal democracy in the 70's provides areas of manoevre and possibilities for change towards democratic control which can be explored peacefully. This prospect of peaceful transformation should not be dismissed especially for a nation whose productive and social structures would, in my view, not survive an open conflict and which would most likely give way towards some form of authoritarian regime either of the left - or more probably of the right. I therefore accept that the « compromesso storico » has a *transitional* validity. At the same time if it is to be anything more than a cover up for the inadequacies and injustices of one of the most unjust liberal democracies in the world the compromise should be effected democratically, openly and most of all efficiently by the Communist Party (any one of these factors openness, democracy, efficiency, as I hope the rest of this essay will show, would by itself be revolutionary given the present state of Italy). The « compromesso storico » therefore should not be relegated to the wheelings and dealings behind - closed - doors between two corporatist parties as it presently risks becoming. For this reason I share the fears of the revolutionary left concerning a possible CP « sell out ».

1. THE RESEARCH

The study concerns two projects for industrialisation in the South; the SIR chemical works at Lamezia Terme and the steel works at Gioia Tauro. The background is extremely complex, though illuminating.

as is well known the South suffers from chronic underdevelopement. The post-war attempt to induce agricultural based development was followed in 1957 by a change in strategy in favour of industrial development. Both of these attempts failed miserably as a result of a mixture of bureaucratic sabotage, inefficiency, corruption, positivistic planning theory and the dynamics of state capitalist market. By the late 60's as an emergency measure a system of planned contracts (contrattazione programmatica) was introduced. In effect this meant direct negociation between the government and capital over the location of industry and even over the level of incentives. The consequence was that, among other things, planned contracts encouraged an increase in investment in basic industry - petrochemicals and steel - mainly because these areas required massive investment and thus allowed greater room for speculation on incentives. By the beginning of the 70's the policy had merely reinforced the crisis in the South by producing even more « cathedrals in the desert ». The creation of such a large number of basic plants producing often

poor quality output gave rise to a national crisis. Overproduction occurred in the basic steel and chemical industries and was accompanied by imbalance within sectors between basic production and specialised production.

The PCI line during this period was that of general support for industrialisation together with bitter criticism of the capital intensive and isolated nature of the investment. At the same time it maintained support for the modernisation of agriculture (2). As regards the problem of sectorial imbalance the PCI seemed to take the short term view that as long as it did not immediately affect employment the problem was not the party's but capitalism's.

The Calabria/Sicily package of 1970/1 was formulated in the wake of the right wing Reggio riots of 1970 as compensation for 23 years of DC underdevelopment. What emerged from this panic measure was a series of promises to guarantee the creation of 19,000 jobs in Calabria mostly via the setting up of capital-intensive industry. 7,500 of these were to be provided by a steel works located at Gioia Tauro near Reggio. Promises of high incentives were made to mainly Italian based chemical industries and pressure was also brought on IRI (the largest state holding corporation) to agree to the suboptimal location of Gioia Tauro for its steel project.

These proposals were completely inadequate for three reasons. First, they brought about the prospect of further capital intensive development. Second, because this particular wave of investment was more speculative and suboptimal than ever, the prospect of its ever providing a stable employment was extremely remote. Third, because it was again designed to increase base production, it could only serve to exacerbate the sectoral imbalance at national level.

The first reaction of the PCI was not inconsistent with its previous policy line on the South. Doubts were expressed about the capital intensive nature of the investment. There was an insistence that induced growth should be guaranteed in the areas destined for the plants' location and that the production should be linked somehow to specialised industry and to agricultural needs (Un Piano Per la Calabria, publicazione della Federazione Regionale del PCI 1973). To this was added the policy of holding the government to its job promises. Formally the PCI maintained this line until July 1977. In effect both the pressing need to provide some form of employment as fast as possible for fear of a recurrence of right wing initiatives at Reggio and pressure from its own rank and file for the PCI to accept what was on offer for fear that northern capitalist interests would succeed in persuading the DC to recant, forced the party into a far more uncritical line. This line was gradually transformed into one of reserved support for the package as the DC and the companies themselves attempted to disengage from their commitments as a result of the economic crises of 1973-4.

The present situation is that, after 7 years delay, the DC is unlikely to go ahead with Gioia Tauro; that the SIR chemical works is threatening to stop production without further guarantees of capital injection; that so far less than a quarter of the promised employment has been provided.

Not at any stage has the PCI shown the willingness or the ability to take a firm stand in the promotion of development in Calabria. However present events are wresting the initiative even further from the party's grasp. On the one hand, the party is being seen as incapable of providing its own policy and

too weak to influence that of the Christian Democrats. This view is particularly prevalent in Calabria where demand for employment is greater than ever. On the other hand, the PCI's support for an ill-conceived and inefficient programme has had a damaging effect on the party's reputation for efficiency in the rest of Italy where the qualified and tactical nature of the support has, not surprisingly, gone without recognition.

This moral set back has already been translated into political losses. In Calabria the pro industrialisation lobby is already being taken in hand by the Socialist Party (PSI) which has adopted a policy of an all out struggle for the fulfilment of the government promises. The Socialist Party's stand may well be helped by the latest policy change of the PCI which consists of a midstream switch to increased support for agricultural development in the hope of appeasing national opinion - a move which is likely to make the party appear opportunist as well as weak to large sectors of Calabrian opinion. Nor will this latest change come in time to rescue the PCI's national position over this matter (let alone to provide jobs for the unemployed of Calabria - a factor which seems to have been lost in the midst of this « politicking »). For nationally the initiative has already been seized by the Republicans who are linked to important sectors of northern capital. They, along with other minority parties and sections of ther DC have used the general state of confusion to justify an attack against state-controlled industry which is deeply involved in the Calabria package. The Republicans have managed to do this by linking up the Gioia Tauro affair with the recent failure of one of the most clientelistic and inefficient of the state controlled industries EGAM - a holding corporation formerly involved in the production of specialised steel. The disrepute into which state owned industries have fallen as a result not only of the Gioia Tauro and EGAM problems, but also due to inefficency and corruption in the state controlled chemical industries, has meant the creation of a climate in which the future growth area of steel production - specialised steel - is likely to be monopolised by Fiat with only partial state participation. This move is a double blow to the PCI. Because Fiat would not contemplate the location of a plant at Gioia Tauro, it will finally put an end to the hopes the party had of solving its dilemma in Calabria which consisted of transforming the Gioia Tauro project into a technologically advanced steel plant capable of providing the sort of labour intensive employment the party rank and file had been demanding. At the same time the participation of Fiat in such advanced specialised production weakens the long term prospects of the nationalised industry - an area it had hoped to concentrate its forces on in the near future.

All this seems to be helping the DC which is quite happy to prolong PCI embarrassment over Calabria and over the future of the state owned industry while at the same time trying to cover their old alliance with private capital. This alliance they hope will serve as a counterbalance to any concessions on the control of state run industry they might have to make to the PCI in the coming months.

Meanwhile PCI indecision is only being increased by the fact that certain elements in its ranks consider that participation of Fiat in specialised steel production is the only way of ensuring an efficient industry and in the long run guaranteed employment.

2. THE PCI FAILURE

The PCI's mishandling of the situation can in part be explained by « objective » factors : lack of political space to do otherwise given the fact that their increased legitimacy is only of recent vintage; lack of political experience of a party which has spent too many years in opposition; the historical weakness of the PCI in Calabria; the lack of technicians who are fully able to appreciate complex industrial problems. These are all explanations given by party cadres. However for a party presenting itself as a capable governing party and a force for social transformation to blame the ineffectivenes of its line on purely objective circumstances is not sufficient.

Indeed it seems to illustrate one of the major reasons for the PCI's inefficiency so far and to justify a criticism which has been made by observers both inside and outside the party. That *the PCI suffers from a subjective inability to transform itself from a party of opposition into one of government capable of changing Italian society.*

As both the failure over the Calabria package and over sectoral planning show, the source of this inability lies in the general strategy pursued by the party - a strategy which was evolved when the PCI was a mere opposition party, yet which has changed little over the last few years, despite the great changes in circumstances. In short it has consisted of PCI's using its two main strengths - its capacity to mobilise, and its capacity to organise at the level of provincial and local government towards the basic aim of claiming concessions from the government of the day. This method of claiming concessions may well have suited the PCI in the past when it had no alternative. It may well be sufficient for a social democrat party such as the PSI whose claims can be easily conceded by the state without the State's putting its future into jeopardy. For a communist party about to join the state apparatus with the aim of transforming it such a policy has definite disadvantages. It means, in the first place that a far greater level of mobilisation and support than for a social democrat opposition party is required for even PCI's transitional demands to be accepted. And to judge from the Calabria issue the PCI has not always been able to raise the requisite level of mobilisation. This fact is illustrated by the complete failure of the PCI demands for dependent industry to be constructed around the projected plants in Calabria. Secondly its reliance in Calabria on a strategy of claiming concessions (as opposed to specifying policies) means that the party is organisationally less prepared to guarantee that the policies will be put into effect once they are conceded. This is illustrated by what has happened in the past when the party has managed to have its own claims accepted. On the one hand, they have more often than not been put forward in such an incoherent way that the DC has been able to sabotage them. That is, the demands have more often than not been partial and specific, lacking any relationship with any overall strategy. This can be exemplified in the case of the Calabria package by the PCI demands that labour should be hired through local employment offices in order to cut out the client system when in fact the majority of workers were imported in with the sub-contractors from the centre and north of Italy and were thus not affected by local clientelism. On the other hand, when the party's claims have been more wide ranging (e.g. when pressure was mounted in the early 70's for a relaunching of the Southern Programme) they have lacked procedural and technical specifications and have naively left central government machinery to decide the means and mode of implementation while the party has been content with merely issuing a post hoc critique when the outcome was not to its satisfaction.

The reasons for this passivity are perhaps endemic in the internal structure of the party. They are :

a) the constant refusal of the party to take a firm stand against strong elements and groups within the movement whose short term interests have not always coincided with the long term interests of the party as a whole or the collectivity it represents.

b) the concept of the state which the party has for various historical reasons adopted and the inadequate view of planning which is derived from it.

c) a lack of democracy and flexibility in the party structure as a whole.

All three factors are dialectically inter-related and inter-determining. Their relationship will be simplified for reasons of presentation. Moreover, when discussing these three points I shall maintain the method already adopted of quoting from the case studies and seeing to what extent they have a more general application.

A) THE PCI'S LINE OF LEAST RESISTENCE

The examples I should like to quote here are two. The first regards the relationship between short term interest of the strong category unions (6) vs. the territorial requirements of Calabria and the investment needs of the sector (with implications for the long term provision of employment).

The influence of these category unions on the PCI has been enormous. Led mainly by FLM but a lesser extent by FULC (7) they emerged from the 60's with a strong structure upon which the PCI relied heavily in its fight against the DC and in its attempt to recoup potential extraparliamentary sympathy. Yet in the early and mid 70's the party's continued reliance on these categories whose structure is by definition limited to the expression of specific interests via mainly revindicative (8) action (despite laudable attempts to broaden their demands to wider social issues) met with contradictions. It meant that even when it no longer coincided with the interests of the masses represented by the PCI the corporatist world view of the category unions still tended to prevail.

This had a double effect on the party's strategy, dictating both form and content. First, the party found it easier to have recourse to the revindicative strength of the category unions to provide a unique short term response to problems even when such problems might have been better resolved by co-ordinated long term action which used the bargaining strength of the unions as a partial tactic only. Certainly, in the case of the Calibria package, strikes and demonstrations were by far the most important feature of the PCI's approach. So much so that both the mass demonstrations and strikes held over this issue seem to have been conceived as almost totally self sufficient strategies. Neither was supported by anything but an uncoordinated list of demands (9) and preparation, which was carried out mostly outside Calabria at the headquarters of the CGIL and the PCI, was thus confined to the short term problems of coordinating the strikes etc.

As I already mentioned the second effect of the category unions influence was on the content of party strategy and not least on the PCI's industrial policy with all its implications for regional policy. For example, it was undoubtedly pressure from FIOM and FILCEA which led to the party's easy

acceptance of a heavy industry-based policy for the South despite the fact that even in the late 60's much of the party supported an agricultural based strategy. This came about not because the unions were not preoccuped by the need to create employment in the South but because their main preoccupation stemmed from a desire to ensure greater investment in their own under-capitalised sectors. Thus the dependence of the party upon the unions to provide a strategy meant that the party's view of the long term employment and territorial requirements of the South was made to coincide with the narrowness of vision objectively endemic in a basically revindicative movement. The category unions were even willing to support sub-optimal plants to ensure a constant flow of investment. Consequently no consideration was given to the long-term effects of such a policy. For this reason the FLM expressed even fewer doubts about the wisdom of building Gioia Tauro than did the party. It is also for this reason that the FLM supported without a great deal of criticism the 1969 Medugno report (which was based on an extremely superficial analysis of the world market) basically because it recommended massive expansion of steel production in the South. This FLM acquiescence came at the very time when PCI economists were forecasting a down turn in world markets. The same « opportunist » line can be attributed to FILCEA. For instance, the union went along with a SIR plant which was known to be a speculative investment; which was at the time considered to be an environmental risk and whose planned production only marginally fitted in with FULC's aims of increasing the Italian owned output of fine chemicals or integrating chemical production with agriculture. The SIR plant is only one example of FULC's short term thinking. The Otana plant in Sardinia, the Liquigas plant at Saline are other examples of the Union's support for investment which was *a priori* unstable. As can be seen from the examination of the Calabria issue the contradictions of such a narrow policy are now beginning to show at national and regional level and are extremely detrimental to the prospects of the PCI. Yet there have also been internal contradictions as a result of this policy. For it has meant that groups whose interests are more in accordance with a labour intensive agricultural strategy - members of the peasants and farmworker's union, (the Federbraccianti), and the unemployed - have been overlooked or have been subordinated to the category union's line. And now that a change in PCI policy towards more emphasis on agriculture is likely these groups are completely unprepared.

The second example of the PCI's bowing to a *rapport de force* is more general and concerns the new turn in the old problem of the North-South relationship. In the late 60's and the early 70's when the crisis in the North was considered to be one of congestion the espousal by the PCI and affiliated bodies of a policy of southern development was thought to be an uncontradictory one.

The recession in the North, the need to renew the industrial infrastructure via efficient injections of capital has meant competition between the regions for the limited amount of funds available. The recent agreement over the law for industrial reconstruction which extends incentives to the North between the PCI and the five other parties, four of whom (the Republicans, the Liberals, the Social democrats) have direct interest in the preservation of northern dominance, is likely to force the PCI to agree to the salvation of a northern productive structure which is potentially healthy against the option of creating from virtually nothing in difficult conditions a possibly suboptimal structure in the South. This is all the more so because, despite sincere expressions of concern for the increased disequilibrium between the regions, the

point of organisational strength of the party and the unions lies in the Centre and North and the point of parliamentary strength seems to lie in the preservation of as much consensus as possible with other parties.

B) THE PCI, PLANNING AND THE STATE

This is perhaps the major point to be stressed. The alternative to the line taken by the PCI over Calabria - that of a strategy of mobilisation around detailed planning which ran counter to chaotic and incompetent government programming, and which used strike action as no more than a tactic - has rarely if ever been contemplated by the PCI (10). Yet to judge from this particular case study this deficiency has proved extremely detrimental to the PCI's hopes of making the « compromesso storico » work to its advantage.

For instance, had the PCI embarked upon a long term strategy aimed at integrating sectoral and territorial requirements of Calabria - one which refused to accept capital intensive projects at all without guarantees of induced industry and provision for agriculture, and one which was backed by serious research and serious consultation with the rank and file of the party as well as with Calabrians in general - the initiatives may well have been taken away from the DC in the early stages. For at this point the government was split and confused as to whether to bow to the pressures from the region or to those from Northern capital. Furthermore in a region where planning is a post hoc justification for what emerges from the wheeling and dealing of the client system any serious planning would have automatically had an impact. Since, even if it had never been implemented, as is highly likely, at least it would have provided the party with a powerful bargaining tool and presented the PCI as an organisation capable of constructive policy. Finally and most importantly it would have given a somewhat disorganised rank and file in the area a sense of direction which the actual policy of submitting to the force majeure of the category unions and northern interests in the PCI could never give it. Now there are obviously technical reasons why the PCI made no attempt to improve its planning capacity. It would, for instance, be unrealistic to expect the party with its lack of physical and financial resources to create a programme capable of matching point for point that of the government every time a new policy is introduced. Nor can it be expected to have access to all the necessary information. However there are other reasons. The over-reliance on union bargaining power has already been quoted. To be added to this a view of the state which the Party has adopted with regard to Calabria and no doubt to other issues.

From all evidence the PCI has tended to consider the state as something to be approached from the outside by, as it were, knocking on the door and asking to be let in in the hope that simple access to the state machinery will enable it to exploit more fully its strengths i.e. its party organisational capacities, its local government organisational ability and its links with the unions. As a result of this view the idea of challenging the state and the DC monopoly of the state has constantly been delayed until the day the PCI's electoral strength gave it formal participation. This attitude, more than anything has led to the kind of PCI impotence as witnessed above. *It has meant that one of the major DC and state strengths - access to information and technical capacity - has survived without threat.* In this respect the PCI has failed in two areas. The weakness of the Calabria policy shows that the PCI has neither built up its own counter-organisation with sections parallel to state institutions, which, even given its modest means, would not have

been impossible (for example the employers association – Confindustria – has a series of such shadow organisations). Nor has it attempted to gain ground among key elements in the state bureaucracy despite recent favourable conditions.

For example, the party's information system is arranged on an ad hoc basis. No research institute exists capable of coordinating it (11). CESPE, the party's centre for research in political economy is under-equipped. Specialised information when required tends to be obtained from individual party officials. Not only is this a time-consuming activity, lack of systematic research into predetermined areas means that there is little feed-back or cross feed for the official himself who more often than not has numerous practical party functions to fulfil. The individualised nature of information is equally evident in the unions – a source upon which the party depends heavily. At FULC and at the FLM no contemporary archives exist. Information is widely dispersed even in a small area such as Catanzaro where knowledge of the important SIR development is divided between regional party officials, local party officials and the unions with no coordination between the three.

This brings us to the most important defect which my research has brought out – lack of communication between the party and union centres and their periphery, the former having little knowledge of local conditions the latter not having any overview of the general conditions. Again quoting from the case of the SIR plant at Lamezia, although central officials were aware of the overall speculative strategy of the company they were unable to apply this knowledge to the specific plant and to the local situation. Local officials on the other hand were unaware of the necessary details of SIR's unscrupulous activities in Sardinia, for example, to appreciate fully the implications of what it was doing in Calabria (12).

Yet it is basically a question of lack of coordination. It is also a matter of an insufficient quantity of information. The passive acceptance on the part of the FIOM of the Medugno report (see p. 12) was not due to opportunism alone. As an official admitted it was also due to the fact that the union was technically incapable of assessing it. It was also lack of technical expertise which prevented a proper critical appraisal of the government's political decision to change the Gioia Tauro project from an integrated plant to an electric ark furnace within the space of a month. Perhaps the most revealing evidence of this lack of technical expertise can be seen in the poor quality of the FULC testimony to the 1972 Chemical Commission compared with the technically qualified testimony of a smaller fascist union CISNAL.

A second illustration of the PCI failure to counter the DC/state monopoly of information concerns the party's attitude towards the state bureaucracy. In the three major national institutes involved in the southern industrial programme ENI (Ente Nazionale di Idrocarburi), IRI (Istituto per la Recostruzione Industriale) and the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno to varying degrees there exists a reaction to DC clientelism, general wastage and inefficiency of which the Calabria policy has been the prime example. The reaction concerns mainly middle range management in IRI and ENI, but also higher range management. To these increasingly organised groups can be added smaller less articulate groups in banks and finance institutes. These progressive cadres possess collectively a high level of technical ability, have access to important information and are becoming increasingly influential as old management of the nationalised industries becomes more discredited. Yet they remain

uncoordinated belonging to radical factions of the DC, PSI and Republicans. Obviously it would have been a grave error of judgement on the part of the PCI to try and carve out its own area of influence in a movement based on a reaction against the party politicisation of the bureaucracy. However the encouragement of a coordinated movement of independent unions the use of the party's new found power to ensure a more meritocratic selection of personnel and of decision making would have gone a long way to neutralising the DC hold over strategic areas of the state. This sort of strategy has been lacking as a result of the PCI leadership's excessive preocupation with the equilibrium of the power relationship with the DC and fear of the reactions of the corporatist minded CGIL to what might be considered a threat to its position. Consequently the dynamic of the movement risks being further dispersed or being opportunistically harnessed by the « return to capitalist efficiency » movement now being sponsored by Fiat - a movement which, as we have seen, has used the Gioca Tauro issue as a focal point for its campaign (13)

C) THE PCI AND DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM

The planning which the PCI has lacked in Calabria is obviously not the idealistic form evolved by distant party technocrats in Rome and imposed from the top as was the practice of the PSI during the 60's.

Rather, as I mentionned earlier, it is a type of planning which should have been evolved via direct consultation with the rank and file, if necessary leapfrogging the hierarchy of the party's democratic centralist structure. *Again, as claimed before, such a policy would not only have served to provide a solid negotiating platform vis a vis the state; by channelling party energies into concrete initiatives it would have revitalised the party base.*

Yet it is mainly because the party is not organisationally flexible enough to carry out such a policy that it opted for the self-reinforcing corporate and electoralist line I have described.

The poor transfer of information within the party is one symptom, another is the tendency, particularly in the South, of the party bureaucracy at regional and provincial level, encouraged by the centre, to act not as two-way transmission points but as buffers between centre and periphery.

It is a result of this inadequate structure that, for instance, the recent tactical change from support for an industrial based policy to support for agricultural based development is being foisted onto the party in Calabria - the only exchange of views being between the centre and the handful of PCI Calabrian deputies and regional officials. This is so much so that one official I talked to who had been basing his policy on the assumption of industrialisation one week found himself, after « directives » from the province, having to prepare for the possibility of land occupation. Others, at the provincial headquarters at Reggio had not realised that this switch meant the gradual withdrawal of party support for the Gioia Tauro project - a cause for which the provincial party had been committed for seven years.

As far as the internal structure of the party is concerned a more planned, consistent and democratic approach would have broken the isolation of the commune branches (including that of Gioia Tauro itself, which despite its

political importance and the mafia-ridden conditions in which the branch is operating has received no direct contact with the party headquarters. It would have prevented the confusion and conflict which is already occurring. Above all it would have provided an opportunity for central party and union officials to edify themselves about the problems of the rank and file.

3. THE RECENT POLICY OF THE PCI

The unnecessary weakness of the party's position as testifed by its very failure to resolve or mediate the sort of contradiction inherent in its Calabria policy seems to have forced the PCI along a recent line at national level which can only inflame the situation. Admittedly the over reliance on purely revindicative action has been modified. But mainly, as claimed earlier, because it is being increasingly substituted in the context of the historic compromise by a policy of gaining concessions within the framework of programmes evolved in collaboration with the other parties : or by the placing of party men on the boards of state institutions.

The policy might be necessary as a partial strategy. And when carried out responsibly with the organised support of a mass movement, it can be extremely effective. However in the case of the compromesso storico such a policy is in danger of becoming the spearhead of the PCI's general strategy. Furthermore, far from being based on an organised mass movement, it suffers from a sad lack of preparation and democratic consent on specific policies. The result is that the PCI has inevitably found itself outflanked by experienced DC administrators and is placed in a position of having to recoup its losses by under-the-table « do ut des » agreements.

Such ineffectiveness is leading in Calabria and Rome – areas where I have conducted numerous interviews – to the party's being accused of opportunism and empire building thus alienating potential allies among the proletarianised middle classes. Further it has done nothing to improve the PCI's power base within the state. Finally it risks further weakening the party's democratic centralist structure by once more reducing consultation with the rank and file.

The party is undoubtedly aware of the problems – or at least sections of it are. Yet, because the problem is formulated in terms of purely superstructural deficiencies to be remedied by short term policy changes or effects of morale boosting little has been done. On the contrary attempts to increase contact with the rank and file and to increase its participation have been ill-conceived-in Calabria at least. The demonstration last July 1977 at Reggio tended to degenerate into more of a publicity stunt to exploit the charisma of a leader of the movement, than an attempt to rally the party in the face of large-scale unemployment. The more concrete initiatives also risk failure for the same reasons. The recent policy of land occupation is in part a substitute for the failure of the party over the Calabrian industrialisation program, in part an attempt to show that it has not lost its radicalism. Unfortunately the lack of capital, lack of outlets for production and too high a ratio between labour and land risks making the initiative just as symbolic as visits of high ranking officials.

4. THE PCI AND THE FUTURE

Now it would be a grave error to consider that the PCI has embarked upon the very revisionist line followed by the PSI in the mid 60's. This is the somewhat crude assumption implicit in much of the « revolutionary » critique of

the « compromesso storico ». For one thing the structures of the two parties are very different. For example the PSI acceded to governement status on the basis of the opportunist use of a tenuous electoral strength provided by an electorally oriented party organisation. The PCI on the other hand, built up consensus by creating an organisational and cultural infrastructure which not only served a restricted party function but a more general communal, regional and national function as well. More than any other factor it has been this infrastructure of affiliated societies, groups and cooperatives serving a cultural purpose which theoretically grants the PCI a certain independence from the complete reliance on the state machinery for its power base – a reliance which the PSI could not resist and which eventually absorbed it.

A second factor distinguishing the PCI from the PSI are its years of control of the local communes particularly in the red belt of Emilia, Umbria, Tuscany. When the PSI joined the governement in the 60's it was devoid of such experience. Furthermore when the PSI did get control of such zones it rapidly became involved in the shadier side of the client system even compromising itself with the mafia in certain areas of the South. So far, despite cases of [illegible], the PCI has on the whole managed to avoid this temptation. Indeed it is fighting a vigorous anti-mafia campaign in Calabria.

A third important advantage over the PSI is the links the PCI has with one of the most progressive union movements in Europe. Despite the problems I have outlined, this union movement is capable of checking some of the more extreme corporatist tendancies of the party – as testifed by the 2nd December 1978 demonstration which helped prevent the 6 party agreement being drawn up at the time. All of the above factors plus an increasingly critical group of younger cadres endow the PCI with a potential for independent action which the revolutionary left has underestimated and which the PSI could never have had without completely sacrificing its privileged position in the state. The recent setbacks in the administrative elections in which the PCI lost 10–12% also seem to be contributing to a revision of former policy.

The problems for the PCI which seem to emerge from the issues discussed in this paper are how to exploit these dynamic elements and how to remedy the structural rigidities which have led the party into the difficult situation in which it finds itself at the moment : whether these dynamic elements are sufficiently strong to influence other elements (e.g. the party and union bureaucracies) who are benefitting from the status quo; whether an attempt to remedy the situation by changing the approach to the « compromesso » might be possible without risking the party's electoral support and the whole future of a movement which is increasingly based on electoralism. Finally, perhaps the most important question is whether Italy could survive the ensuing power vacuum without an abrupt move to the right.

Whatever the answers it has become apparent from the limited case I have looked at that the PCI is in need of a more flexible and less paternalistic relationship to its rank and file, a more efficient and coherent approach to planning and a more open and aggresive line towards DC/state incompetence and corruption. I hope that the admittedly partial analysis I have made above would indicate that such reforms are not based on moralistic and utopian hope but are a strategic imperative.

University of reading
October 1978 (15).

Footnotes

1. The approach taken by the *New Left Review* is indicative of this attitude. For example it has re-examined Gramscian theory in a series of abstract critiques without looking at the

practical implications for its main exponent the PCI. See for example Perry Anderson's over-theoretical article : « The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci » *NLR* No. 100 Feb-Apr 1977.
2. See Chiaramonte G. *Un Piano per il Mezzogiorno* Editori Riuniti 1971.
3. S.I.R., one of the major beneficiaries of the package, had already built up its turnover from 15.000 million lire to 131.999 million (at 1971 prices) in the space of 10 years almost entirely as a result of speculation on government incentives.
4. The last estimate made by IRI for its expected losses on Gioia Tauro is in the region of 300.000 million lire.
5. The fact that SIR, which previously had only formal participation in partially state owned Montedison, has now a place on the board is another testimony to the DC private capital rapprochement - as is the series of Confindustria (the employers federation) DC secret talks held recently.
6. Category unions are sections of the Confederation Unions (CGIL, CISC, UIL) which represent specific trades and skills.
7. FIOM (Federazione Italiana di Operai Metalmeccanici) is the dominant branch of the Metalworkers union the FLM (Federazione di Lavoratori Metalmeccanici) and is affiliated to the major communist linked confederate union the CGIL-FILCBA (Federazione Italiana di Chimici ed Affini) is to FULC (Federazione Unitaria di Lavoratori Chimici) what FIOM is to the FLM.
8. « Revindicative » is an anglicised version of the useful italian word « revindicativo » meaning « having to do with claims or demands ».
9. In fact all that emerged from the communist left in terms of programming over the first five years of the Calabria package was adherence to a joint union platform in 1976 which consisted of 7 pages of badly articulated and vague demands for, for example, « the realisation of a programme for industrial infrastructure » « the setting up of agriculture related industry ».
10. In fact the regional secretary of Calabrian PSI admitted in a personal interview that the major reasons why the PSI had made such progress in the area was that not only had they used the same clientelistic practices as the DC but that they also had a strategy backed by some form of planning.
11. c.f. the very recent formation of the Argentino Group which is an attempt to fill this vacuum, but is likely to prove piecemeal and has come rather late in the day.
12. The consequence is that the company is :
a) delaying completion of the plant to gain maximum interest on incentives already paid out to it by the government.
b) refusing to produce in the plants which are ready in order to create a crisis among the workforce to secure further government aid.
c) excluding other firms in order to ensure the crisis cannot be relieved by alternative employment.
Finally the unions are being used to put pressure on the government to make sure that the crisis is turned into a further influx of incentives. These are all tricks of the trade which could have been foreseen and acted upon had the party been better organised.
13. In the case of this phenomenon, which is by no means confined to Rome or large state enterprises alone, the failure of the PCI is not only due to its electoralist approach to the state. It also arises from its theoretical premise which has linked state activity too closely to the interests of the dominant faction of the bourgeoisie and which therefore has been slow to see areas of rupture not only between the state and the dominant faction of the bourgeoisie but within the state where different factions of the bourgeoisie are represented. The result is that it has only been able to attract middle class support on an individual basis and has thus failed to attract discontented groups en bloc.
14. Numerous examples of underhand PCI activity can by quoted - jobbing at Rai TV and at the Bank of Siena, under the table agreements over employment incentives regarding law 183 for the Mezzogiorno to name but three. Examples of the PCI's being outmanoeuvred are even more numerous. One of the more spectacular being the appointment of an incompetent DC « yes man » to the post of president of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno in the place of competent DC yes man who had originally been removed as result of PCI pressure (although in July 1978 the new appointment was removed as a result of pressure from the PCI and the minority parties).
(15) This article was completed in October 1978 on the basis of information gathered in Calabria and Rome in 1977. Since then the situation has obviously changed. The main transformation has been the withdrawal by the Communist Party of its external support for Andreotti's Christian Democrat Government in January 1978 thereby weakening the prospects of the « compromesso storico ». Even so, neither this event nor any of the others which have occured in the meantime have invalidated the conclusions of this article. On the contrary, it seems that one of the major reasons for the C.P.'s withdrawal was the position of impotence in which the C.P. found itself vis-à-vis the DC and the State - the very point which has been stressed in the article.

CSO: 3120

HIDDEN ARMS DEPOTS DISCUSSED, INVESTIGATED

No Comment on Arms Discovery

Amsterdam TROUW in Dutch 19 May 80 p 5

[Text] The Hague--Minister of Defense Scholten will not answer the questions of Member of the Second Chamber G. van der Spek (PSP)[Pacifist Socialist Party] as to why a large parcel of arms has been lodged in the woods near Heythuisen in Limburg. "For the sake of national interests" the minister refuses to say anything on the discovery which was made by a couple of inhabitants of Asten and Helmond at the beginning of April.

The discoverers of the parcel, who for recreation searched a wooded area behind the rest-home De Bedelaar, were alarmed when they found about 20 cases of arms there. After the police had been notified, the explosives cleaning service removed the materials.

According to the state police in central Limburg, arms from World War II were at issue here, but in a number of publications the assumption has been expressed that it is a matter of stockpiles of war materials established by domistic and foreign intelligence services. The American CIA was also mentioned in this connection. The theory was also expressed that the explosive charges were intended to blow up large buildings and bridges and to hamper traffic connections.

Member of the Chamber Van der Spek made it known that he is not satisfied with Minister Scholten's announcement.

Arms Investigation Continues

Amsterdam VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 27 Jun 80 page number not given

[Text] The Hague--The members of the chamber who were informed by Minister Scholten (Defense) about the origin of the arms found at Heythuisen in Limburg, think that the minister was correct in publicly keeping quiet on that. PSP Member of the Chamber Van der Spek however does not accept this maintaining of secrecy by the minister and the members of the Chamber Commission for the Intelligence and Security Services.

Van der Spek, in a long series of chamber questions, inquired of Scholten about the possible connection between the arms found on the Limburg property and NATO plans for the forming of small guerrilla-like groups. Van der Spek also made inquiries of the American congress, which in the past had been very critical of the American secret service CIA, as to whether they knew about the origin of the cases with machine guns, explosives and maintenance materials.

Van der Spek still wants to utilize all possibilities to gain information on the matter. According to Van der Spek "the number of matters being kept secretive in this affair is in any event completely idiotic."

Den Uyl Supports Scholten

Amsterdam DE WAARHEID in Dutch 28 Jun 80 page number not given

[Report by parliamentary editorial staff]

[Text] The parliamentary group chairmen of the PvdA [Labor Party], CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal], VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] and D'66 [Democrats '66], Den Uyl, Lubbers, Rietkerk and Terlouw have stated that Minister of Defense Scholten of the Second Chamber was justified in keeping quiet about the background of the mysterious arms discovery at Heythuisen in Limburg.

Scholten refused to comment on questions by Van der Spek and he was supported in that refusal by a chamber majority of the PvdA, CDA, VVD and D'66 when he said he would inform the commission for the intelligence and security services /"to the best of his ability"/ [in italics]

This commission has now been informed /"in confidence"/ and has come to the conclusion that Scholten has /"justly appealed to the constitution"/ [in italics] in his refusal.

According to rumors, foreign secret services, including the CIA, are involved in the burying of arms in Heythuisen. Van der Spek meanwhile has contacted American authorities with a request for information.

The decision for the secret arms cache is said to have been made in the time of the Den Uyl cabinet.

8700
CSO: 8014/1446A

REPORTER VISITS COAST ARTILLERY TORPEDO BATTERY FORT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Jun 80 p 36

[Article by Knut Falchenberg: "A Torpedo Scene"]

> [Text] The appearance of an island can be deceiving. From the outside Leroy looks like any scene in the archipelago. But inside the island, deep down in the mountain, feverish activity prevails. Here alarms are sounded, radar signals are plotted, and men work in uniform. Lieutenant Einar Riis-Johannessen pushes a lighted button. A moment later a door opens in the side of the mountain, and out jumps at 7-meter-long torpedo weighing 1,500 kg. It dives in the sea and disappears.

The soldiers at Visteroy Fort on Leroy work without daylight. They live in comfortably equipped spaces inside the mountain where they never have visitors. Neither wives nor friends are allowed inside, because technical details here are kept secret.

We are in an underground torpedo battery which is a part of the coast artillery fort on Leroy. The mission is clear: No enemy ship will be allowed to reach the city of Bergen. Torpedoes are lined up inside the mountain. And nearby guns can shoot on short notice.

"We easily lose track of time. There are no windows here to tell daylight from dark," said Frode Roskeland from Ytre Arna. He is doing his military service in this mountain.

Soldiers on watch play cards or throw darts. The fragrance of food is in the air. Private Trond Gjertsen from Arendal cooks over a frying pan in the galley.

"You understand that here we are so few soldiers that we have to take care of ourselves. We have a skillful cook, who is also a conscript. But today he is away, so I have taken over the galley," said Gjertsen. He did not want to disclose the identity of the dish he was preparing--he said he would not know that until the meal was ready.

"In our little fort all the soldiers get their own living expense money in cash, so we can choose what we want on the menu. In fact last Sunday we saved our food money. Then we caught cod for our dinner ourselves," said Gjertsen.

All at once one hears, "Alarm, alarm, alarm." Soldiers and officers drop what they have in their hands. They rush into the torpedo room, and they haul a 7-meter practice torpedo into position in one of the torpedo tubes. In a few minutes everything is ready for a practice shot.

The tension is now high in the control room. Even if this is a practice, things can still go wrong. Twice previously it happened that a torpedo lost steering control and ran right into the mountain. Another danger is that the practice torpedo can disappear forever in the sea. Wide margins of safety, however, ensure that neither ship traffic nor the civilian population have anything to fear.

Now the men are concentrating mainly on hitting the target which is a vessel 4 km farther out in the fiord. That is the one to "sink." From the control room the vessel is observed on two radar screens, and at the same time it is studied through the fort's periscope.

The commander gives the order, "Fire!" A small door opens in the side of the mountain facing the fiord, and with a roar the torpedo comes out. The propellers are already turning before the torpedo dives under.

After a short time the torpedo reaches the target. But instead of sinking the boat with two men on board, the large "cigar" passes 6 meters under the keel and continues toward the open sea. Later it is retrieved by the target boat and brought back to the fort for overhaul and preparation for the next practice.

This torpedo battery is only a portion of the coast artillery fort on Leroy. They also have artillery and anti-aircraft weapons. And in its own hole in the mountain there is a control room for mine warfare.

The fort is partly manned around the clock. This watch arrangement means that the officers and non-commissioned officers can visit their families every other day and every other weekend.

9287
CSO: 8139

NEW CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONAL TRAINING DAENIKER

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHE in German 9 July 80 p 3

[Article by Ulrich Kaegi: "A Thorny General--Gustav Daeniker: Public Relations Expert Becomes Army Training Chief"]

[Text] Gustav Daeniker, Ph D, who has been the chief of staff for operational training with the rank of major general in Bern since 1 July, is not an unknown quantity.

Writes the Swiss Socialist Party's press service (No 79/1980) furiously: "But if, as the last straw, a type like Gustav Daeniker from the Farner and Company polemics agency is to become the chief of the entire defense department, it means that the dominance of the rightwing conservatives in the military bureaucracy will, as usual, be flagrantly flaunted..."

This social democrat eruption was timed to coincide with Maj Gen Gustav Daeniker's start in his new office, in which he replaced the retiring Division Commander Hans Rapold as chief of staff for operational training. In case of a general mobilization, he would become deputy chief of the General Staff.

However, the former state councillor from Solothurn, Alfred Wyser, is still, and will remain, the chief of the overall defense department. The SP press service not only managed to confuse two totally different functions; it had also been obviously asleep at the switch when Daeniker was appointed to his new position. This had in fact happened exactly 1 year ago, in early July 1979, and at that time there was no reaction whatever. "Thank God!," muttered the EMD chief at the time, Rudolf Gnaegi, with much relief.

Gustav Daeniker has of course frequently been the cause or the instigator of wild controversy in the past, most of the time without meaning to be. In the course of many years, he has crossed swords with the Bern establishment at least as often as with the Left--whether this was caused by his enjoyment of controversy, a hankering for animated debates or a conscious disregard for political tactics.

The defense pavilion at Lausanne's Expo 64, to which he contributed his expertise, was loaded with controversy and was by no means universally applauded. Another unforgettable event was the campaign during the middle of the 1960's for nuclear arming of Switzerland, conducted by Zurich officers led by Daeniker. This started after the two antinuclear initiatives which, though not universally accepted, still managed to reach their goal--renunciation of nuclear armament--as is well known today.

Daeniker, who started in his new job suntanned and noticeably trimmer, is an unusual federal civil servant. It is unusual for a 52-year old reserve colonel to transfer to the training corps, a move which promises no financial rewards for Daeniker, who up to now was the director of the Dr Rudolf Farner Public Relations Agency.

Also unusual is the intellectual baggage he brings to his new job: for one thing, there is his "Strategy for a Small State" (1966), which he now sarcastically calls "the work of a middle-aged but furious man." This was followed in rapid succession by "Israel's War on Three Fronts" (1967); "Why They (i.e., the Americans in Vietnam) Lost" (1969); "How To Secure Europe's Future" (L972); and finally "Anti-Terrorist Strategy" (1978). DIE WELTWOCHE, among others, has for years benefited from the public debate about questions of security policies contained in a total of more than 700 essays, articles, lectures and appearances on radio and television. He is a member of the London Institute for Strategic Studies and remains as a special lecturer on military science at the Federal Technical University and occasionally at Zurich University.

Finally, he is unusual also in not always being satisfied with watching from behind his desk at "people in far-off Turkey" fighting among themselves. He has frequently felt the necessity to get into the midst personally and to witness a war at first hand.

As a war correspondent, he experienced a total of 4 weeks under fire in the frontline mud: twice in Vietnam, once in Laos and Cambodia and twice in the Near East--where he arrived late, "because the Israelis won in such a hurry." "These were of course not the type of battles which might be expected to occur in Europe. I was not really scared because I felt my time had not come yet. It was more like nervous tension; I thought 'they' could really stop shooting about now."

Lieutenant Daeniker, then a student of History in Zurich, suffered an injury to his cervical spine during military service. This put an end to his burning ambition of following in his father's footsteps by becoming an instructor, i.e., a regular officer.

His father, Col Gustav Daeniker, died in 1947, when his son was only 19. Contemporary history describes him as a controversial "accomodator" to Hitler Germany. Was this really true?

Historian Georg Kreis describes him as a "Germanophile patriot," but still, a patriot. His son was subjected to ostracism by society, as was his entire family. Later, when going through his father's papers, "I found proof that he was a completely honest man. I am sorry only that he did not recognize the forces in power in Germany for what they were.

"He gained that insight relatively late in the day, after 20 July 1944, when some of his German officer friends stood trial after the Hitler assassination plot. But at that time everyone was confronted with the question: who knew what, and when?"

Daeniker Senior, an admirer of German soldiery, blind to the character of the Nazi regime, commander of the Walenstadt firing range and an internationally renowned ballistics expert, found out too late. During the summer of 1940, after the heartbreaking defeat of France, he visited Berlin and upon his return summarized his impressions in a confidential memorandum to the government. In the same manner as the Swiss envoy at the time, Hans Froelicher, he pleaded for political flexibility so as not to incite Germany into attacking Switzerland. The memorandum became public and caused a scandal which cost him his position.

The son, now two ranks above that of his father, has swept away the shadow attached to the family name. Among his duties as chief of staff for operational training (SCOS) are the following: preparation of the triennial general maneuvers involving the top civilian Federal authorities and the army; operational exercises and corps staff exercises in which corps commanders and their staffs are tested; the operational seminar for corps and division commanders; and the army staff exercise which next year will for the first time test the new chief of the general staff, Joerg Zumstein.

In his capacity as the army's chief instructor, the SCOS is in addition available to the chief of the general staff as a consultant on problems involving security policy. It is true that in time of peace a major general's staff consists of only two general officers, one secretary and one administrator. But during the exercises the "manpower reservoir" of students and auxiliaries can grow to more than 1,000 people.

Gustav Daeniker realizes that as a troop commander he occasionally lost his self control. His high-pitched somewhat strident voice often made him sound cynical, cold and in some cases wounding. But on losing an argument, he is perfectly capable of making fun of himself while licking his wounds.

"There were times when I blew my top when I did not see the kind of performance which, justly or unjustly, I expected. On those occasions I occasionally used inappropriate language, but I trust that this will not happen again. Nevertheless, I will not be satisfied with unsatisfactory work."

Gustav Daeniker, who has dissolved his relationship with the Farner agency, is older, well balanced, quieter and, having reached the position he had

always wanted, perhaps even possessed of greater wisdom: "In my new job I am available to everybody, rightists and leftists. I want to render meaningful service to our country."

But the newly hatched general who continues to confront those around him with unconventional ideas has kept his porcupine quills. But then, why should everybody have to be as smooth as an eel?

9273
CSO: 3103

ISIKLAR BLASTS RECENT VIOLENCE, GOVERNMENT

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 15 Jul 80 pp 1, 9

[Text] DISK General Secretary Fehmi Isiklar, who held the first press conference after the DISK General Council, concentrated on recent political events and the events in Corum and Fatsa. He said, "In the Demirel-Turkes duo, one complements the other. Recent events clearly show that they are acting with the utmost determination to bring about fascism in the purest sense."

Isiklar, in brief, said the following during the press conference in which members of the Administrative Council participated, "Demirel, the head of political power, in order to cover up and overlook attacks by fascists aimed at taking control of certain provinces, has initiated new types of operations in regions in which live those of our citizens who became aware of all this before their compatriots in other areas. He should know very well that no one up to now has benefited from imitating Mussolini."

"Therefore, had the government been cast from power, it would have spared not only our people but itself."

Isiklar said that the bourgeoisie was unable to realize its hopes at Fatsa and that no fewer guns would turn up in Islamkoy where Demirel was born were it surrounded and searched in the same manner. He stated that the Turkish working class and the toiling people will defeat fascism in the end although they will encounter infamous defeats along the way. Observing that there was no place for useless debate in a period of effective struggle, he continued, "The alternative of fascism has become the concrete goal of the bourgeoisie which is unable to overcome the economic and political malaise."

"All subunits and worksites of DISK are in the process of becoming unshakable bastions in the struggle against fascism. There is no waiting for tomorrow: today is the day for all democratic forces to make a more determined and concerted struggle. At this juncture DISK will carry out in full the class duty incumbent upon it."

Isiklar touched on the viza problem in West Germany during the press conference. He said that the viza problem could not be resolved by a pseudo-nationalist government that goes begging to imperialists. He also said that proposals have been made to TURK-IS for effective action.

CSO: 4907

NAP BLAMED FOR CORUM VIOLENCE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 21 Jul 80 pp 1, 11

[Text] JP Corum Deputy Ahmet Cinbek disclosed that the events in Corum were sparked by members of the NAP.

During a conversation with reporters, Cinbek, who conducted investigations in the districts of Corum, Sungurlu, and Alaca in the company of Minister of Food, Agriculture, and Husbandry Cemal Kulahi and Minister of State Koksal Toptan, answered the question, "How do you assess the events in Corum?", saying, "The events are very worrisome. We have emphasized and still emphasize that we as JP members have been against these types of incidents from the start. Unfortunately, the incidents were initiated by NAP militants. The incidents were set off for a purpose. The purpose was to turn JP and NSP members into NAP partisans."

It is reported that the numbers of arrested from the grizzly events that began again in Corum on 4 July has reached 100.

Moreover, the 6 fascists who set up a barricade across the Cemilbey Road the day before yesterday were arrested on a tip. It is understood that those arrested had taken hostage 21 villagers in a minibus going to the town market on 2 July. These individuals later burned the minibus.

It is reported that in this connection that municipal services have been severely curtailed since RPP Mayor Dr Turhan Kilicciogl u exited the town on 4 July because of the breakdown in public security. Garbage has accumulated in the town and garbage collectors, for whom protection cannot be provided, are unable to get to work. The town has virtually turned into a flea market because of the incidents. Villagers and artisans, whose lives cannot be protected, try to sell the vegetables and fruits they grow by displaying them at random places in the town. Meanwhile, large numbers of citizens have been compelled to convert a part of their homes into shops.

CSO: 4907

BRIEFS

NEW IDENTITY NUMBERS--Preparations are under way to provide each citizen with an identity number to facilitate public services. Information regarding each citizen's personal, social and educational history will be fed into the Interior Ministry's computer system with this number. Interior Ministry officials said that they expected the system to be ready for a trial in a pilot city in 1981. [Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 0430 GMT 8 Jul 80 TA]

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